Facts
- Sharon Lee Glynn, age sixteen, waited in the Springfield bus terminal to board a Peter Pan bus.
- A stranger, Patrick Werner, approached from behind and stabbed Glynn three times, killing her; the attack was unprovoked.
- The terminal was located in an area with substantial criminal activity; the operator regularly contacted police about security problems and knew security was needed.
- Neither Peter Pan nor the terminal operator employed security guards in the terminal at the time.
- An expert testified that uniformed security guards are strong crime deterrents and that a uniformed guard probably could have prevented the stabbing.
- Glynn’s estate sued Peter Pan and the terminal operator for negligence and wrongful death based on failure to provide adequate security.
Issues
- Whether sufficient evidence allowed the jury to treat the terminal operator as a common carrier owing a heightened duty of care to patrons.
- Whether sufficient evidence supported findings that each defendant breached its duty by failing to provide reasonable security.
- Whether the assault was a reasonably foreseeable risk such that defendants’ negligence could be found a proximate cause despite the intentional criminal act.
Decision
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the judgments for the plaintiff.
- The court held evidence permitted a finding that the terminal operator functioned as a common carrier in the operation and control of terminal facilities used by passengers.
- The court ruled the directed verdict motions were properly denied because a rational jury could find breach of the heightened duty to provide reasonable security in light of known crime conditions.
- The court held the criminal assault could be found foreseeable and not a superseding cause as a matter of law; the evidence supported proximate cause, including expert deterrence testimony.
Legal Principles
- A common carrier owes passengers a high duty of care consistent with practical operation, including reasonable measures to protect against foreseeable third-party criminal acts.
- Foreseeability of criminal harm may be shown by the character of the location and known prior security problems; prior identical crimes are not required.
- An intentional criminal act does not automatically sever causation; if the risk of such an act is reasonably foreseeable and the defendant’s conduct increased that risk, proximate cause may be found.
- On a directed verdict, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; the motion is denied if a rational jury could find for the plaintiff on duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation.
Conclusion
The court upheld a jury verdict imposing liability on a bus company and terminal operator where known crime conditions supported a finding that reasonable security measures were required and that the absence of such measures could foreseeably and proximately contribute to a fatal third-party assault.