## Facts

- Michael W. Shaw worked as a sales representative for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) from 1971 until his termination on December 6, 1989.
- A major customer (Eli Witt) accused Shaw of stealing sixty cartons of cigarettes from its warehouse.
- RJR inventoried cartons in Shaw’s company vehicle and found an “excess number of cartons” in violation of company policy; the parties disputed the reason for the overage.
- Shaw was terminated, criminally prosecuted for theft, and later acquitted.
- After the termination, an RJR manager responded to a customer inquiry (Dorothy Giantonio) about why Shaw was no longer servicing the account, allegedly implying theft or wrongdoing.
- Shaw claimed the information “must have been” communicated to others because current and former RJR employees contacted him about the circumstances of his termination.
- Shaw sued RJR in federal court (diversity) for defamation and invasion of privacy under Florida law.

## Issues

1. Whether statements by an employer’s manager to an inquiring customer about an employee’s termination for suspected theft were protected by qualified privilege under Florida law.
2. Whether Shaw produced competent evidence of actionable publication and express malice sufficient to defeat any qualified privilege and sustain a defamation claim.
3. Whether the limited communication of the termination circumstances to a customer and/or coworkers constituted an actionable invasion of privacy (including public disclosure or false light).
4. Whether any genuine dispute of material fact precluded summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

## Decision

- The court granted RJR’s motion for summary judgment on Shaw’s defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims.
- The court held the customer communication fell within a qualified privilege and Shaw failed to produce evidence of express malice to overcome that privilege.
- The court found Shaw’s asserted proof of broader “publication” was speculative and insufficient to create a triable issue.
- The court rejected the invasion-of-privacy theory because the communication lacked the required “publicity,” involved employment-related conduct in a business context, and otherwise failed for reasons paralleling the defamation analysis.
- The court denied RJR’s motion for leave to file a reply brief.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- Under Florida law, a qualified (conditional) privilege protects communications made in good faith on a subject in which the speaker has an interest or duty to a recipient with a corresponding interest or duty, including certain employment-related explanations to business customers.
- To defeat a qualified privilege in defamation, the plaintiff must present specific evidence of express malice (a primary motive to injure), not conclusory allegations.
- Speculative assertions that defamatory information “must have been” communicated to others do not establish actionable publication or create a triable issue.
- Invasion-of-privacy claims based on disclosure generally require “publicity” to the public at large or a broad audience; limited disclosure in a business setting to a small group typically does not satisfy that element.
- Where an invasion-of-privacy theory mirrors a defamation theory based on the same communication, the same privilege and evidentiary failures may defeat both claims.

## Conclusion

The court entered judgment for the employer because the termination-related explanation given to a customer was qualifiedly privileged and Shaw failed to produce competent evidence of express malice or sufficient publication; the associated invasion-of-privacy claim also failed for lack of required publicity and for the same privilege-based reasons.


Shaw v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 818 F. Supp. 1539 (M.D. Fla. 1993)