## Facts

- Yvonne Shelton worked as a staff nurse in the Labor and Delivery unit of a state hospital operated by the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ).
- The unit did not perform elective abortions, but nurses were required to assist in emergency procedures that could terminate a pregnancy.
- Shelton, a Pentecostal Christian, asserted that her faith prohibited her from participating directly or indirectly in ending a life, including abortions of live fetuses.
- For a period, UMDNJ permitted Shelton to trade assignments with other nurses to avoid procedures she believed were abortions.
- In 1994, Shelton refused to assist with an induction procedure for a patient with a serious pregnancy complication; after being asked for documentation from her pastor, she submitted a personal written statement describing her religious objection.
- In a later emergency involving a critically ill pregnant patient requiring a procedure that would terminate the pregnancy, Shelton again refused to participate.
- UMDNJ concluded that Shelton could not remain in Labor and Delivery because emergency coverage required all nurses to participate when needed.
- UMDNJ offered Shelton a lateral transfer to the Newborn Intensive Care Unit and offered assistance in locating other positions that would not conflict with her beliefs.
- Shelton declined the transfer and did not cooperate in pursuing alternative placements; UMDNJ terminated her employment.
- Shelton sued under Title VII, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the New Jersey Conscience Statute, and the First Amendment; the district court granted summary judgment for UMDNJ.

## Issues

1. Whether UMDNJ reasonably accommodated Shelton’s religious practice under Title VII by offering transfer options rather than exempting her from emergency pregnancy-termination procedures in Labor and Delivery.
2. Whether Shelton’s termination violated the New Jersey Conscience Statute or the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.
3. Whether the termination violated the First Amendment, including whether Shelton was subjected to viewpoint discrimination based on her religious beliefs.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for UMDNJ.
- The court held UMDNJ reasonably accommodated Shelton under Title VII by offering a lateral transfer and help finding other positions that avoided the conflict.
- The court held UMDNJ was not required to keep Shelton in Labor and Delivery while excusing her from essential emergency duties.
- The court rejected the state-law claims, concluding they did not provide a basis for relief on the record presented.
- The court rejected the First Amendment claim, finding no evidence Shelton was targeted for her religious viewpoint rather than for refusing required emergency-care duties.

## Legal Principles

- Under Title VII, after a prima facie showing of a religious accommodation claim, an employer avoids liability by demonstrating it offered a reasonable accommodation or that additional accommodation would impose undue hardship.
- A reasonable accommodation need not be the employee’s preferred option and need not guarantee the employee a conflict-free position in the job the employee chooses.
- An employer is not required to eliminate or reassign essential job functions to accommodate religious practice, particularly where patient care and emergency response are implicated.
- An employee’s refusal to cooperate with reasonable accommodation efforts may defeat a claim that the employer failed to accommodate.
- A public employer does not violate the First Amendment absent evidence the challenged action was motivated by viewpoint discrimination rather than neutral enforcement of job requirements.

## Conclusion

The court held that a state hospital satisfied Title VII by offering a nurse a lateral transfer and other placement assistance to avoid religious conflicts, and it could lawfully terminate her when she refused to perform essential emergency duties and declined reasonable alternatives.


Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000)