## Facts

- The Secretary of Labor sued Wheaton Glass Company under the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the Equal Pay Act (EPA), alleging sex-based wage discrimination at a glass manufacturing plant.
- Wheaton employed female “selector-packers” and male “selector-packer-stackers” in the same general warehouse operation involving manual handling and visual inspection of glass products.
- Female selector-packers were paid about $2.14 per hour, while male selector-packer-stackers were paid about $2.355 per hour (approximately 10% more).
- Wheaton asserted the male classification included additional “stacking,” heavier physical tasks, and greater flexibility of assignment.
- The Secretary contended the jobs’ core functions were the same and that the claimed extra duties were incidental or sporadic and did not justify the wage gap.
- After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Wheaton, finding the Secretary had not proved the differential was based on sex and that the company proved a statutory defense as a “factor other than sex.”
- The Secretary appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the female selector-packer job and the male selector-packer-stacker job were “equal work” under the EPA, meaning substantially equal in skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions despite different titles and some task differences.
2. Whether Wheaton carried its burden to prove the wage differential was justified by a statutory exception, specifically “a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”

## Decision

- The Third Circuit reversed the judgment for Wheaton.
- The court held the female selector-packers performed work substantially equal to the male selector-packer-stackers within the meaning of the EPA.
- The court held Wheaton failed to prove the pay differential was based on a “factor other than sex.”
- The case was remanded for appropriate relief consistent with the EPA claim (including injunctive relief and back wages as sought).

## Legal Principles

- “Equal work” under the Equal Pay Act means substantially equal work, not identical work; job content controls over job titles or formal descriptions.
- A plaintiff establishes a prima facie EPA violation by showing a wage differential between opposite-sex employees performing substantially equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions.
- Once a prima facie case is shown, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the differential is justified by one of the EPA’s four statutory exceptions, including a “factor other than sex.”
- Minor, occasional, or incidental task differences do not justify a wage differential when the jobs’ primary duties and responsibilities are substantially the same.
- An employer may not avoid EPA liability by relabeling the same work with a different title to pay women less than men.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit treated the EPA as requiring a functional comparison of job content and held that substantially equal work cannot be paid differently based on sex; because Wheaton’s asserted distinctions did not amount to a genuine non-sex-based factor, the wage disparity violated the Equal Pay Act.


Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970)