## Facts

- Eric Davis, Natasha Shumate, and their minor child, Naera (all African American), sought overnight accommodations at the Clarion Hotel in Scranton, Pennsylvania.
- Davis went to the front desk to rent a room for himself, his fiancée (Natasha), and their child.
- Lisa Pierce, the front-desk clerk, told Davis no rooms were available and directed him to a nearby Comfort Suites.
- At the Comfort Suites, a clerk indicated the Clarion had available rooms and called the Clarion; the clerk reported that the Clarion had many rooms open (plaintiffs alleged the call confirmed 52 available rooms).
- Plaintiffs returned to the Clarion. Plaintiffs’ pleadings and later submissions differed on some timing details and who was present at each moment, but plaintiffs alleged Pierce again refused to rent them a room.
- Plaintiffs alleged that Pierce told Davis she did not have to explain herself, ordered him to leave, and that when Davis asked whether the refusal was because he was Black, Pierce replied, “Yes.”
- Plaintiffs alleged that three white men were given a room “without hesitation” around the same time.
- Natasha, Naera, and others in the lobby allegedly heard and witnessed the exchange.
- Plaintiffs asserted federal civil-rights claims tied to the attempted hotel-room contract, as well as Pennsylvania tort claims including intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and defendants moved to dismiss and later sought summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether Natasha Shumate and Naera Shumate, who were not the person speaking to the clerk, could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on the hotel’s alleged race-based refusal to contract—either as intended third-party beneficiaries of the proposed room-rental contract or through an agency relationship with Davis.
2. Whether the alleged conduct at the front desk (including an alleged admission that the refusal was because Davis was Black) could satisfy Pennsylvania’s “extreme and outrageous” requirement for IIED, and whether the record evidence of emotional harm was sufficient to survive summary judgment.

## Decision

- The court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.
- On § 1981 standing, the court held Davis, as the person attempting to contract for the room, had a cognizable contractual interest to pursue a § 1981 claim.
- The court also concluded Natasha and Naera could pursue § 1981 claims where the alleged facts supported standing as intended third-party beneficiaries of the room-rental contract Davis sought to make; the court further recognized that an agency theory could apply, with the existence and scope of agency presenting fact questions.
- On IIED, the court allowed the claim to proceed past the pleading stage based on the alleged race-based refusal of lodging, the alleged public confrontation, and the alleged “Yes” response to Davis’s question about racial motive.
- At summary judgment, the court applied Pennsylvania’s demanding IIED standard and evaluated whether each plaintiff produced competent evidence of severe distress; it granted or denied summary judgment on the emotional-distress claims based on the sufficiency of the proof in the record for each claimant.

## Legal Principles

- 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects the equal right to “make and enforce contracts” without racial discrimination, including in ordinary retail and service transactions such as renting a hotel room.
- A plaintiff asserting a § 1981 contract claim must show an impaired contractual relationship, but standing may extend beyond the person presenting payment when the transaction is intended to benefit accompanying guests.
- Intended third-party beneficiary status is generally a question of law for the court, determined from the contract’s nature and surrounding circumstances.
- By contrast, whether one person acted as another’s agent, and the scope of any agency relationship, ordinarily presents questions of fact for the jury when disputed.
- Under Pennsylvania law, IIED requires conduct that is “extreme and outrageous,” and distress that is severe; courts apply this tort narrowly.
- Pennsylvania courts commonly require competent evidence of severe emotional distress (often medical or psychological evidence), especially at the summary-judgment stage.
- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and assesses plausibility; on summary judgment, the court determines whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant on the supported record.

## Conclusion

Shumate held that a hotel’s alleged refusal to rent a room because of race can support § 1981 claims not only for the would-be contracting party but also for accompanying family members who plausibly qualify as intended third-party beneficiaries (and potentially through agency), and it treated IIED as viable at the pleading stage while requiring competent proof of severe distress to proceed at summary judgment.


Shumate v. Twin Tier Hospitality, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 521 (2009)