## Facts

- Environmental organizations sued the Secretary of Agriculture and Forest Service officials over a Southern Pine Beetle control program in designated wilderness areas in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
- The program authorized extensive tree cutting and chemical spraying within wilderness areas to address beetle infestations.
- Plaintiffs alleged the program primarily protected adjacent commercial timber and private property rather than wilderness values.
- Plaintiffs asserted violations of NEPA (no EIS before commencing a major action), the ESA (risk to the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker), and the Wilderness Act (incompatibility with preserving wilderness character).
- The government argued Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1) gave broad discretion to take insect-control measures the Secretary deemed necessary.
- The court found the government offered little evidentiary support on whether beetle spread from wilderness to adjacent lands required in-wilderness interventions or whether alternatives outside wilderness could address the threat.
- After an earlier preliminary injunction halted most activities pending an EIS, preparation of the EIS was repeatedly delayed, and the court addressed plaintiffs’ deferred summary-judgment motion on core Wilderness Act claims.

## Issues

1. Whether “necessary” in Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1) requires a substantive showing that in-wilderness insect-control measures are effective and justified, rather than merely within agency discretion.
2. Whether insect-control decisions under § 4(d)(1) are committed to unreviewable agency discretion or are reviewable against Wilderness Act standards.
3. Whether injunctive relief should continue while NEPA documentation remains incomplete and ESA-related risks persist.

## Decision

- The court construed § 4(d)(1) to impose a substantive constraint: the Forest Service must justify wilderness-area insect control as “necessary” in light of the Act’s preservation mandate.
- The court rejected the contention that § 4(d)(1) created nonjusticiable, unreviewable discretion; Wilderness Act standards provide manageable limits for judicial review.
- Because the agency had not adequately shown necessity/effectiveness and NEPA compliance remained outstanding, the court continued injunctive relief against most of the program, allowing only limited actions tied to protecting the endangered woodpecker.

## Legal Principles

- Wilderness Act exceptions permitting management actions inside wilderness are read narrowly in light of the statutory priority to preserve wilderness character.
- Under § 4(d)(1), “necessary” requires an affirmative, evidence-based justification that the chosen measures are needed and effective to address the asserted threat, particularly when the primary aim is protection of non-wilderness commercial or private interests.
- Agency action under the Wilderness Act is subject to judicial review under ordinary administrative-law standards because the Act supplies enforceable constraints (including preservation of wilderness character).
- NEPA’s EIS requirement and ESA-related risks may support injunctive relief pending completion of required environmental analysis and substantiation of statutory compliance.

## Conclusion

The court held that Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1) does not grant open-ended discretion for insect control in wilderness; the agency must demonstrate that intrusive measures are truly necessary and effective under the Act’s preservation standards, and the court maintained an injunction while the agency lacked adequate justification and had not completed required NEPA review.


Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987)