## Facts

- Kenneth S. Stanbury worked for Sigal Construction Corporation as a project manager from May 1984 to June 1985.
- Sigal terminated Stanbury; internal testimony indicated performance-based reasons, though Stanbury was told the reason was a reduction in work.
- Stanbury later pursued a job opportunity contingent on approval by Lincoln Properties; Lincoln partner William Janes sought a reference.
- Janes contacted Sigal project executive Paul Littman and understood Littman to have direct, personal knowledge of Stanbury’s work; Janes testified Littman indicated he had worked with Stanbury.
- Littman had not supervised or worked closely with Stanbury and relied on unverified “general impressions” from others.
- In the reference call, Littman made negative statements about Stanbury’s competence and work qualities, including remarks implying Stanbury’s termination reflected poorly on his abilities.
- After the call, Lincoln declined to hire Stanbury; Janes testified the reference was decisive.
- Stanbury sued Sigal for slander based on Littman’s statements.
- A jury found for Stanbury and awarded $370,440; the trial court denied Sigal’s JNOV/new-trial motion and ordered remittitur to $250,000 or a new trial on damages; Stanbury accepted $250,000.

## Issues

1. Whether Littman’s job-reference statements were nonactionable opinion or actionable statements of fact (including opinions implying undisclosed false facts).
2. Whether an employment-reference qualified privilege applied and, if so, whether Stanbury proved common-law malice by clear and convincing evidence sufficient to defeat the privilege.
3. Whether Sigal was vicariously liable because Littman acted within the scope of employment or under implied/apparent authority when giving the reference.
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in jury instructions concerning authority, malice, and the refusal to require a “corporate malice” finding.
5. Whether the remitted $250,000 damages award was unsupported or excessive, and whether ordering remittitur was an abuse of discretion.

## Decision

- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for Stanbury and the $250,000 remitted award.
- The court held the statements were actionable because, in context, they conveyed or implied defamatory factual assertions about Stanbury’s professional competence.
- The court recognized a qualified privilege for employment references but upheld the jury’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Littman acted with common-law malice that defeated the privilege.
- The court upheld Sigal’s vicarious liability because the evidence supported findings of scope of employment and implied/apparent authority.
- The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions, including the refusal to give a separate “corporate malice” instruction.
- The court upheld the remittitur and rejected both Sigal’s challenge to the reduced award and Stanbury’s cross-appeal seeking reinstatement of the original verdict.

## Legal Principles

- Statements framed as professional evaluations may be actionable in defamation when they imply undisclosed, objectively verifiable facts, particularly where the audience understands the speaker to have personal knowledge.
- Employment references are generally protected by a qualified privilege, but the privilege is forfeited upon clear and convincing proof of common-law malice, including reckless disregard for truth or for the plaintiff’s rights.
- An employer may be liable for a defamatory reference given by a managerial employee when the communication is within the scope of employment or made with implied or apparent authority.
- Corporate liability under respondeat superior does not require an additional showing that management authorized or ratified the defamatory statement when the employee acted within the scope of employment.
- A trial court may order remittitur as an alternative to a new trial on damages; appellate review is deferential absent abuse of discretion, and reputational harm, lost employment opportunity, and emotional distress can support a substantial compensatory award.

## Conclusion

The court upheld liability for a defamatory job reference where a company executive spoke as if informed while lacking personal knowledge and failing to verify damaging assertions; the employment-reference privilege was defeated by clear and convincing evidence of common-law malice, the employer was vicariously liable under authority and scope-of-employment theories, and the remitted $250,000 compensatory award was sustained.


Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1991)