Facts
- Two unmasked men robbed a federally insured savings and loan association in Chicago on February 27, 1964; five employees witnessed the robbery and gave written statements to the FBI that day.
- A witness saw one robber leave in a white 1960 Thunderbird with a large scrape on the right door; police soon located such a car and learned it belonged to Simmons’s sister-in-law, who said she had loaned it to William Andrews that afternoon.
- FBI agents went without a warrant to the home of Andrews’s mother and searched the premises; in the basement they found two suitcases, one containing items linked to the robbery (including a holster, a sack similar to one used in the robbery, and bank wrappers).
- The next morning, agents obtained snapshots of Andrews and Simmons and separately showed the photos (mostly group pictures) to each eyewitness without indicating that a suspect was depicted; each witness identified Simmons as one robber, and none identified Andrews.
- Later, witnesses again identified Simmons from additional photographs; three witnesses also identified Garrett as the second robber.
- Simmons, Garrett, and Andrews were indicted and jointly tried; all five employees identified Simmons in court, and three identified Garrett.
- Before trial, Garrett moved to suppress the suitcase evidence; to establish standing he testified at the suppression hearing that the suitcase was similar to one he owned and that he owned clothing found in it; the motion was denied.
- Over objection, Garrett’s suppression-hearing testimony was introduced at trial on the issue of guilt.
- Defense counsel sought production of the photographs under the Jencks Act; the trial court denied the request, ruling the photos were not witness “statements.”
- The district court convicted Simmons and Garrett; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
- Whether the pretrial photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive that it violated due process by creating a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
- Whether the Jencks Act required production of the photographs shown to witnesses as “statements” related to their testimony.
- Whether using Garrett’s suppression-hearing testimony at trial as evidence of guilt violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Decision
- The Court affirmed Simmons’s conviction, holding the photographic identification procedure was not so suggestive as to violate due process.
- The Court held the Jencks Act did not require production of the photographs because they were not witness “statements” within the statute.
- The Court reversed Garrett’s conviction, holding that a defendant’s suppression-hearing testimony offered to support a Fourth Amendment motion may not be admitted at trial on guilt over the defendant’s objection.
Legal Principles
- A conviction following photographic identification will be set aside on due process grounds only if the photo procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, assessed case by case.
- The Jencks Act requires production only of qualifying “statements” of a witness (written statements adopted by the witness or substantially verbatim recordings of oral statements); photographs shown to a witness are not themselves “statements.”
- When a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, that testimony is not admissible against the defendant at trial on the issue of guilt if the defendant objects, to avoid forcing a choice between asserting Fourth Amendment rights and preserving the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Conclusion
The Court rejected due process and Jencks Act challenges to the government’s use of pretrial photo displays and refusal to produce the photos, but it held that suppression-hearing testimony given to support a Fourth Amendment motion cannot be used as substantive proof of guilt at trial over the defendant’s objection, requiring reversal of Garrett’s conviction.