## Facts

- In 1933, adjacent Staten Island parcels (157–159 Driggs and 163–165 Driggs) were subject to a reciprocal driveway easement intended to provide access to a garage on 157–159 Driggs.
- In 1978, the Accardos acquired both parcels, placing the dominant and servient estates in common ownership.
- In 1982, the Accardos conveyed 163 Driggs to the Webers by a deed that did not mention any driveway easement.
- In 1984, the Accardos conveyed 157–159 Driggs to the Corrados by a deed that expressly referenced the driveway easement purportedly burdening 163 Driggs.
- In 1986, the Webers built a permanent deck on 163 Driggs that covered part of the purported easement area.
- In 1993, plaintiffs bought 163 Driggs under a deed silent as to any driveway easement, though they knew a prior easement had once existed (based on a survey and conversations).
- In 1996, defendants bought 157–159 Driggs under a deed repeating the easement language from their predecessor’s deed.
- By 2003, a tree and fencing on defendants’ property blocked vehicular access to the garage; the garage was used for storage and a motorcycle.
- In December 2003, defendants removed the tree and fencing to regain access via the claimed driveway easement; plaintiffs then sued to prevent use of the driveway over 163 Driggs.

## Issues

1. After an easement is extinguished by merger, can it be recreated upon severance of title where the servient deed is silent, but the dominant deed references the easement and the servient owner had notice of the prior easement?
2. Did defendants obtain an easement by necessity permitting use of the driveway over plaintiffs’ property?

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated judgment for plaintiffs.
- The court held the 1933 driveway easement was extinguished by merger when both parcels came under common ownership.
- The court held the easement was not recreated after severance because the deed conveying the alleged servient parcel (163 Driggs) did not expressly create or reserve any easement burdening that property.
- The court rejected the view that notice or knowledge of a prior easement, or an easement recital appearing only in the dominant parcel’s deed, could impose a new burden on the neighboring parcel.
- The court held no easement by necessity arose because defendants failed to show strict necessity rather than convenience.

## Legal Principles

- An easement is extinguished by merger when the dominant and servient estates come into common ownership.
- Once extinguished by merger, any later easement must be created anew in a writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds.
- A reference to an easement in the dominant estate’s deed, without corresponding language in the instrument conveying the servient estate, is insufficient to burden the servient land.
- A purchaser’s knowledge or notice that a prior easement once existed does not substitute for a valid written creation of a present easement burden.
- An easement by necessity requires strict necessity (typically to avoid landlocking), not merely improved or preferred access.

## Conclusion

The court held that merger eliminated the prior driveway easement and that it was not reestablished by later conveyances because the servient deed contained no express burden; it also denied an easement by necessity because defendants sought convenience rather than strictly necessary access.


Simone v. Heidelberg, 877 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y. 2007)