## Facts

- Stanley Simrin (father) and Marjorie Joan Simrin (mother) divorced and had four minor children.
- The final divorce decree awarded custody of the children to the father and gave the mother visitation each weekend.
- About a year after entry of the decree, the mother moved to modify custody, seeking transfer of custody to her and an award of attorney’s fees and costs for the post-judgment proceedings.
- The father filed his own request to modify the visitation provisions by reducing the mother’s weekend visitation to one weekend per month; the notice for the father’s request was technically defective, but the matter was litigated at the hearing.
- At the modification hearing, the trial court received evidence concerning the parents’ conduct, including matters predating the divorce as well as events occurring after the decree, given the relatively short time since the initial custody order.
- Before the divorce proceedings, the parties had participated in marriage counseling with a rabbi. Before counseling began, the rabbi and both spouses entered into an agreement that counseling communications would remain confidential and that neither spouse would call the rabbi as a witness in any divorce proceeding.
- At the modification hearing, the mother attempted to call the rabbi to testify. The rabbi refused based on the agreement, and the trial court declined to compel his testimony.
- The trial court denied the mother’s request to change custody and denied her request for attorney’s fees and costs, and it granted the father’s request to reduce the mother’s visitation to one weekend per month.
- The mother appealed, challenging the custody and visitation rulings, the denial of fees and costs, the ability of the court to proceed on the father’s defectively noticed request, the lack of express findings (including “unfitness”), and the refusal to compel the rabbi’s testimony.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mother’s request to modify custody and in reducing her visitation.
2. Whether the trial court could consider and grant the father’s visitation-modification request despite defective notice where the parties proceeded to litigate the issue at the hearing.
3. Whether the trial court was required to make express findings, including a finding that a parent was “unfit,” to support the custody/visitation modification orders.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mother attorney’s fees and costs for the post-judgment proceedings.
5. Whether a pre-counseling confidentiality agreement could be enforced to prevent compelling testimony from the rabbi-marriage counselor, or whether enforcement was void as against public policy as an improper suppression of evidence.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s orders.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s request to change custody and in modifying visitation to one weekend per month.
- Any defect in notice of the father’s request did not warrant reversal where the parties proceeded on the matter at the hearing.
- The trial court was not required to make express findings of parental “unfitness” or other formal findings beyond the custody/visitation determination grounded in the children’s welfare.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees and costs.
- The trial court properly refused to compel the rabbi’s testimony because the parties’ confidentiality agreement was enforceable and not void as against public policy.

## Legal Principles

- In custody and visitation matters, the child’s welfare is the primary consideration; the trial court has broad discretion, and an appellate court will not interfere absent a clear abuse of that discretion.
- A party seeking to change an existing custody arrangement must show changed circumstances sufficient to justify disturbing the prior order; where limited time has passed and claimed rehabilitation remains uncertain, the trial court may decline to alter custody.
- In post-judgment custody/visitation proceedings, the court is not required to enter formal findings or an express finding of “unfitness” if the order reflects a determination based on the children’s welfare and the record supports the result.
- Procedural defects such as defective notice may be treated as waived where a party proceeds to litigate the issue without showing prejudice.
- Awards of attorney’s fees and costs in family law proceedings are committed to the trial court’s discretion; denial will be upheld absent a showing that the ruling was beyond the range of reason under the parties’ financial circumstances.
- A written agreement made in connection with marriage counseling that communications will remain confidential and that the counselor will not be called as a witness may be enforced to bar compelled testimony, and enforcement is not automatically invalid as an agreement to suppress evidence where the agreement’s function is to allow frank counseling communications.

## Conclusion

Simrin v. Simrin affirmed post-divorce orders leaving custody with the father, reducing the mother’s visitation, and denying the mother fees and costs, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion and that the parties’ pre-counseling confidentiality agreement validly prevented compelling testimony from the rabbi who provided marital counseling.


Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965)