## Facts

- Dalip Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States in 1990 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1993 through marriage to a U.S. citizen.
- In 1998, Singh pleaded guilty in Oregon state court to misdemeanor harassment under Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065.
- The Immigration and Naturalization Service charged Singh as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), alleging the harassment conviction was a “crime of domestic violence” involving his spouse.
- The Immigration Judge concluded the Oregon harassment statute necessarily involved the force element required for a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and ordered Singh removed.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals summarily affirmed without opinion, making the Immigration Judge’s decision the final agency decision for review.
- Singh petitioned for review, contending Oregon harassment is not a “crime of violence” under § 16(a) and therefore not a removable “crime of domestic violence.”

## Issues

1. Whether a conviction under Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1)(a)(A) (offensive physical contact intended to harass or annoy) categorically has as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” required by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
2. If not, whether that conviction can support removability as a “crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and vacated the removal order.
- Applying the categorical approach, the court held Oregon harassment is not categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
- Because the offense is not a § 16(a) crime of violence, it is not a “crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), defeating the charged ground of removability.

## Legal Principles

- Under the categorical approach, the analysis focuses on the statutory elements of the offense—not the underlying conduct in the specific case—and asks whether the least conduct criminalized satisfies the federal definition.
- 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires an element of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person or property.
- A state statute that reaches non-forceful, non-violent, or minimal contact (even if offensive) is broader than § 16(a) and is not categorically a crime of violence.
- A “crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) requires a qualifying “crime of violence” under § 16; absent that predicate, removability on this ground cannot be sustained.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that Oregon’s harassment statute criminalizing “offensive physical contact” is broader than the federal “crime of violence” definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), so the conviction could not serve as a “crime of domestic violence” basis for removal; the court therefore vacated the removal order.


Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2004)