## Facts

- Slazengers Limited filed a sealed federal trademark and counterfeiting action against Leo D. Stoller, Christine Skierkewiecz, and their companies, and sought an ex parte temporary restraining order and seizure order under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)).
- Attorneys for Slazengers (the “defendant attorneys”) presented the ex parte seizure request to Judge James B. Parsons, who granted an ex parte TRO and seizure order.
- U.S. Marshals executed the seizure order at plaintiffs’ Chicago office and warehouse, accompanied by Slazengers’ attorneys and private investigators (the “defendant investigators”).
- In the trademark case, plaintiffs moved to vacate the seizure order. In a later memorandum opinion, Judge Parsons found that the defendant attorneys had made numerous misrepresentations during the ex parte presentation and stated he would not have issued the seizure order absent those misstatements.
- Despite the problems with the seizure presentation, Judge Parsons later entered a preliminary injunction limiting plaintiffs’ sale of “Slazenger”-marked rackets.
- Plaintiffs then filed this separate damages action against the attorneys, investigators, Slazengers, and others, alleging tort and related claims, including trespass to chattels (based on interference with property taken or handled during the seizure) and trespass to land (based on the alleged refusal of attorneys and investigators to leave after the Marshals completed the seizure and departed).
- The defendant attorneys and defendant investigators moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b), arguing that executing a facially valid court order bars tort liability and that several counts were legally defective (including counts aimed at defendants plaintiffs had already dismissed).

## Issues

1. Whether a facially valid Lanham Act seizure order gives attorneys and investigators a privilege that defeats tort claims for actions taken within the order’s authorization.
2. Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for trespass to land by alleging that attorneys and investigators remained on plaintiffs’ premises after the Marshals finished executing the seizure order and left.
3. Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for trespass to chattels by alleging interference with property that exceeded what the seizure order permitted.
4. Whether claims premised primarily on alleged misrepresentations made by attorneys in the course of obtaining the seizure order stated a legally recognized basis for civil liability in this separate action.
5. Whether counts naming only defendants previously dismissed from the case had to be dismissed.

## Decision

- The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.
- The court treated the seizure order as providing a privilege for conduct carried out pursuant to the order, but not as a blanket shield for conduct that went past the order’s limits.
- The court allowed the trespass-to-land claim to proceed to the extent it was based on allegations that the attorneys and investigators stayed on the property after the seizure was complete and after the Marshals left.
- The court allowed the trespass-to-chattels theory to proceed to the extent the complaint alleged interference with plaintiffs’ property that was not authorized by the seizure order.
- The court dismissed certain other counts that failed to state a claim, including counts that, in substance, sought damages from opposing counsel based on litigation conduct in obtaining the ex parte order rather than on actionable, unauthorized acts during execution.
- The court dismissed counts directed only at defendants who were no longer parties because plaintiffs had already dismissed them.

## Legal Principles

- A person acting under a facially valid court order generally has a privilege against tort liability for acts the order authorizes.
- That privilege can end when the actor exceeds the order’s terms or continues acting after the order’s authority has run out; an initially lawful entry can become a trespass if the actor stays without permission once any legal authorization ends.
- At the pleading stage, allegations that private attorneys or investigators remained on private property after marshal-supervised execution ended can state trespass to land.
- Interference with personal property can support trespass to chattels where the complaint plausibly alleges control, handling, retention, or taking beyond what a court order allowed.
- Courts may dismiss claims that attempt to convert alleged wrongdoing in courtroom advocacy into separate tort liability where the law provides no such cause of action or where litigation-related protections apply.
- Claims against parties no longer in the case are subject to dismissal.

## Conclusion

Skierkewiecz held that participation in executing a Lanham Act seizure order generally protects attorneys and investigators from tort liability for authorized acts, but plaintiffs stated viable trespass claims where they alleged defendants went past the order’s limits—especially by remaining on the premises after the Marshals left and by interfering with chattels in ways not permitted—while other defective counts, including those aimed at nonparties and those improperly grounded on litigation advocacy alone, were dismissed.


Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F. Supp. 931 (1989)