## Facts

- Henry W. Skinner, a Texas prisoner sentenced to death, was convicted of murdering his live-in girlfriend and her two adult sons.
- Skinner maintained he was incapacitated by alcohol and codeine and asserted an alternative suspect committed the murders.
- The State collected biological evidence (including knives, an axe handle, vaginal swabs, fingernail clippings, and hair samples); some items were not DNA-tested before trial.
- Texas enacted Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64, authorizing limited postconviction DNA testing under specified conditions.
- Skinner filed two Article 64 motions seeking testing of untested evidence; Texas courts denied both for failure to satisfy statutory prerequisites.
- Skinner then filed a federal civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief requiring the district attorney to provide access to the evidence for DNA testing and alleging Texas’s procedures violated due process.
- The district court dismissed; the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the view that postconviction DNA-access claims must be brought in habeas.

## Issues

1. Whether a convicted state prisoner may seek access to biological evidence for postconviction DNA testing through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, rather than only through federal habeas corpus.
2. Whether such a § 1983 action is barred because success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence under the Preiser/Heck line of cases.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held that Skinner’s request for access to evidence for DNA testing is cognizable under § 1983.
- The Court held the action is not barred by Preiser or Heck because an order for DNA testing does not necessarily imply the conviction or sentence is invalid.
- The Court emphasized it did not decide whether Skinner had a constitutional right to DNA testing or whether Texas’s DNA-testing scheme was constitutionally adequate.

## Legal Principles

- Habeas is the exclusive federal remedy only when a prisoner seeks immediate or speedier release; claims that do not necessarily result in speedier release may proceed under § 1983.
- A postconviction request for access to biological evidence for DNA testing does not necessarily imply unlawful custody because testing results may be exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive.
- The Heck bar applies only when success in the § 1983 action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of an outstanding conviction or sentence; a judgment ordering DNA testing alone does not meet that standard.
- A procedural due process challenge to a state’s postconviction DNA-testing procedures may be litigated under § 1983, even if favorable testing might later support a separate effort to overturn the conviction.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a state prisoner may use § 1983 to seek access to biological evidence for DNA testing because obtaining testing does not, by itself, necessarily call the conviction or sentence into question, leaving any later challenge to the conviction for separate proceedings.


Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011)