## Facts

- Rosanne Sliney alleged that her uncle, Domenic A. Previte, Jr., sexually abused her from about 1968 (age 5) to 1977 (age 14).
- Sliney alleged that by about 1988 she began recalling some of the abuse, disclosed it to relatives, and received an apologetic letter from Previte.
- She alleged extensive psychiatric treatment and hospitalizations related to the abuse.
- In 1991, under family pressure, Sliney signed a release purporting to discharge Previte from all claims.
- Sliney alleged that in 2011 she first recalled additional abuse, including being forced to engage in sexual acts with strangers as a child.
- On January 30, 2012, she filed a civil action in Superior Court under G. L. c. 260, § 4C (then providing a three-year limitations period for civil actions alleging sexual abuse of a minor, subject to a discovery rule).
- While the case remained in appellate proceedings, the Legislature enacted St. 2014, c. 145 (effective June 26, 2014), expanding the § 4C limitations period from three years to thirty-five years and stating retroactive application to civil actions regardless of filing date, subject to specified conditions.

## Issues

1. Whether St. 2014, c. 145 applied retroactively to a child sexual abuse civil action that was still pending on appeal when the statute took effect.
2. Whether retroactive application reviving an otherwise time-barred civil claim violated due process under the Massachusetts or Federal Constitutions.
3. Whether retroactive revival violated the “standing laws” language of art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
4. Whether the court should consider an argument not preserved in the trial court or intermediate appellate court.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment on the pleadings for Previte and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that St. 2014, c. 145 applied retroactively to Sliney’s claims because the Legislature expressly directed retroactive application and the case was still pending (not finally adjudicated) when the amendment became effective.
- The court held that retroactive enlargement of the limitations period, as applied, did not violate due process.
- The court rejected the art. 10 “standing laws” challenge.
- The court declined to address an argument not raised in the Superior Court or the Appeals Court.

## Legal Principles

- When the Legislature expressly provides retroactive application of an amended statute of limitations, the amendment applies to cases still pending and not yet final when the amendment takes effect.
- Revival of time-barred civil claims does not, by itself, violate due process; the constitutionality turns on whether the retroactive measure is reasonable in scope and rationally related to a legitimate public purpose, considering fairness to defendants in defending older claims.
- Art. 10’s “standing laws” language does not bar legislative changes to civil statutes of limitations, including retroactive extensions, where the enactment is otherwise valid.
- Appellate courts generally will not consider issues not preserved in prior proceedings.

## Conclusion

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Legislature’s 2014 retroactive extension of the limitations period for civil claims alleging child sexual abuse applied to a case still pending on appeal, and that reviving the claims did not violate due process or art. 10, requiring reversal of judgment for the defendant and remand.


Sliney v. Previte, 473 Mass. 283 (2015)