## Facts

- Robert F. Donahue drove a vehicle that struck and killed the Slocums’ eighteen-month-old son.
- Donahue pleaded guilty to motor vehicle homicide arising from the child’s death.
- The Slocums sued Robert Donahue and Dolores J. Donahue for negligence and gross negligence.
- The Donahues denied negligence and filed a third-party complaint against Ford Motor Company, asserting Ford’s negligence and breach of implied warranties based on an alleged defect involving the driver-side floor mat.
- The Donahues claimed Donahue inadvertently pushed the floor mat under the throttle, and that while backing down his driveway the engine raced and the car continued to accelerate despite repeated braking, ultimately hitting a curb, becoming airborne, turning, and striking a fence.
- The Donahues’ theory included expert testimony that the floor mat was defective and could interfere with the vacuum booster, causing power brakes to fail.
- Before trial, the Slocums settled with Ford for $150,000 in exchange for a release of all claims against Ford.
- Ford moved for summary judgment on the Donahues’ third-party claims, arguing (1) the settlement was in good faith under G.L. c. 231B, § 4 and therefore barred contribution, and (2) indemnity was not available on these facts as a matter of law.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Ford and entered a separate and final judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on the third-party action; the Donahues appealed that judgment.
- The Donahues argued the settlement was not in good faith because the amount was too low and because Ford allegedly permitted the Slocums to use Ford-associated experts, which they claimed showed collusion.
- The underlying negligence case against Robert Donahue later proceeded to trial and resulted in a verdict against him, but the appeal concerned only the dismissal of the third-party claims against Ford.

## Issues

1. Whether Ford’s settlement and release with the Slocums, made in good faith under G.L. c. 231B, § 4, discharged Ford from liability for contribution to the Donahues, warranting summary judgment on the contribution claim.
2. Whether the Donahues could pursue common-law indemnity against Ford where any Ford liability would be based on Ford’s own negligence or breach of warranty rather than the Donahues’ purely vicarious or derivative liability.

## Decision

- The Appeals Court affirmed the summary judgment for Ford.
- The court held that the settlement and release were made in good faith within the meaning of G.L. c. 231B, § 4, so Ford was discharged from all contribution liability to other alleged tortfeasors.
- The court rejected the Donahues’ claim that the settlement amount and alleged expert-sharing required a finding of bad faith, concluding the record permitted a determination that the settlement was fair and reasonable, including in light of litigation risk and the possibility Ford would not be found liable.
- The court held that indemnity was unavailable because indemnity is limited to situations of purely vicarious or derivative liability, and any liability Ford might have would be for its own conduct (negligence or breach of warranty), not a basis to shift the Donahues’ responsibility entirely to Ford.

## Legal Principles

- Under G.L. c. 231B, § 4(b), when a plaintiff gives a release in good faith to one of multiple persons liable in tort for the same injury, the released party is discharged from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
- A settlement may be found to be in good faith even if the settling amount is arguably low; a low figure can reflect the settling party’s assessment of risk, including the chance of a defense verdict.
- Allegations of collusion must be supported by facts; speculation (including claims based only on the settlement amount or the fact that plaintiffs relied on certain experts) does not, by itself, defeat a good-faith determination.
- Common-law indemnity in Massachusetts is limited to cases where the party seeking indemnity is without fault and is liable only vicariously or derivatively for another’s wrongdoing.
- Indemnity is not a mechanism to reallocate loss between alleged joint tortfeasors whose liability, if established, would be direct and based on their own negligence or breach of warranty; in that setting, contribution (subject to statutory limits) is the proper theory.

## Conclusion

The Appeals Court affirmed dismissal of the Donahues’ third-party claims because Ford’s good-faith settlement and release with the Slocums barred contribution under G.L. c. 231B, § 4, and the Donahues could not obtain indemnity where they faced potential liability for their own conduct and Ford’s potential liability would be independent rather than purely derivative.


Slocum v. Donahue, 693 N.E.2d 179, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 937 (1998)