## Facts

- James W. Smith purchased air travel on Comair from Roanoke, Virginia to Minneapolis, Minnesota, connecting through Cincinnati, Ohio.
- Smith boarded the first flight in Roanoke without being asked for identification.
- In Cincinnati, while attempting to board the connecting flight to Minneapolis, a Comair representative asked Smith to step aside; the flight departed without him.
- A supervisor later refused to give Smith an explanation; Smith observed security guards watching him in the terminal.
- Approximately three hours after the missed flight, the supervisor told Smith he was denied boarding because he did not match a physical description in his Delta frequent-flyer account; Smith later learned Delta did not keep such descriptions.
- Smith did not have identification because he had left his wallet in his car at the Roanoke airport; he offered alternative means to verify identity, which Comair declined.
- Comair ultimately issued Smith a ticket to return to Roanoke rather than continue to Minneapolis.
- While waiting for the return flight, Smith told a Comair representative he wanted to punch him; security briefly restrained Smith, and the airline initially sought his removal, but he was allowed to fly back to Roanoke.
- Smith sued for breach of contract, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) based on the denial of boarding, security observation, and brief restraint.

## Issues

1. Whether the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted Smith’s state-law breach of contract and tort claims to the extent they challenged the airline’s boarding decision and boarding procedures as an airline “service.”
2. If any portion of the false imprisonment and IIED claims was not preempted, whether those tort claims stated a claim under Kentucky law.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Comair and Delta.
- The ADA preempted Smith’s breach of contract claim and the tort claims insofar as they complained of Comair’s boarding procedures and refusal to allow Smith to board.
- Any remaining tort allegations distinct from the boarding decision failed under Kentucky law.
- Smith did not establish false imprisonment because the facts did not show compelled confinement or restraint of liberty as required.
- Smith did not establish IIED because the conduct alleged was not extreme and outrageous and did not support severe emotional distress under Kentucky standards.

## Legal Principles

- The ADA preempts state laws and state-law claims “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier,” including claims that would regulate airline boarding procedures and passenger-screening decisions.
- State-law contract and tort theories are preempted when, in substance, they challenge how an airline provides boarding-related services or impose state standards on those services.
- Under Kentucky law, false imprisonment requires restraint of liberty by force or threat such that the person is compelled to remain or go somewhere against their will; observation by security and brief restraint in response to a disturbance, without confinement, is insufficient.
- Under Kentucky law, IIED requires conduct so outrageous and intolerable as to offend generally accepted standards of decency and morality, plus severe emotional distress; ordinary disputes and limited security interventions at an airport do not meet that threshold on the facts alleged.

## Conclusion

The court held that the ADA barred state-law claims attacking an airline’s boarding practices as part of its “services,” and it further held that Smith’s remaining allegations did not satisfy Kentucky elements for false imprisonment or IIED, warranting summary judgment for the airline defendants.


Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998)