## Facts

- Alaska enacted the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act in 1994, requiring sex offenders physically present in the state to register with law enforcement and periodically verify information.
- The Act created a central registry maintained by the Department of Public Safety.
- Registrants had to provide identifying and conviction-related information; much of it (including name, address, photograph, and offense information) was publicly available, including online, while some details remained confidential.
- The Act applied retroactively to persons convicted of qualifying offenses before the Act’s enactment.
- John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before 1994 and were required to register and comply with verification obligations (including quarterly verification for aggravated offenders).
- The registrants sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that retroactive registration and notification imposed unconstitutional punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the state, finding the Act nonpunitive; the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding the Act’s effects were punitive.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Act’s retroactive application was prohibited.

## Issues

1. Whether Alaska’s retroactive application of its sex-offender registration and community-notification law constitutes “punishment” barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.
2. Whether the Act’s public dissemination of registrant information, including via the Internet, is so punitive in effect that it overrides the legislature’s civil intent.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 6–3 decision.
- The Court held that the Act is a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme and therefore may be applied retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
- The Court found the legislature intended a public-safety regulatory measure rather than criminal punishment.
- The Court concluded the Act’s effects were not “so punitive” as to negate the stated civil intent, emphasizing the absence of direct restraints on residence, travel, or employment.
- Concurring opinions agreed in the judgment that the challengers did not show punitive effect sufficient to trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause.
- Dissents argued the Act imposed substantial burdens and stigma amounting to punishment when applied to pre-enactment offenses.

## Legal Principles

- Ex post facto analysis of a claimed civil regulatory scheme applies a two-step inquiry: (1) legislative intent (civil versus punitive), and if civil, (2) whether the effects are “so punitive” as to override that intent.
- A statute labeled civil will be treated as punitive only upon the “clearest proof” that its effects negate civil intent.
- Registration and broad public access to truthful conviction-based information generally do not constitute an “affirmative disability or restraint” comparable to traditional punishment when the law does not itself impose direct limits on movement, residence, or employment.
- Public dissemination, including Internet publication, may serve a nonpunitive public-safety purpose and is not treated as punishment solely because it causes reputational harm or collateral difficulties.
- A rational connection to public safety and a lack of excessiveness relative to that purpose support characterizing registration and notification requirements as civil regulation rather than punishment.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld Alaska’s retroactive sex-offender registration and Internet notification requirements, ruling that the law operates as a civil public-safety measure and therefore does not impose retroactive punishment barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.


Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)