## Facts

- Michael Marnell Smith, a Virginia prisoner, was convicted of capital murder and faced a sentencing proceeding at which the jury could recommend death.
- Before trial, at defense counsel’s request, Smith was examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist.
- During the evaluation, Smith disclosed prior deviant sexual conduct, including an incident in which he tore a girl’s clothes on a school bus but decided not to rape her.
- At the sentencing phase, the prosecution called the psychiatrist, who testified about the school-bus incident over defense objection.
- The jury recommended a death sentence, and the trial court imposed it.
- On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Smith raised multiple claims but did not assign error to the admission of the psychiatrist’s testimony; counsel later stated this omission was a deliberate choice based on then-existing Virginia law.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, applying its rule limiting review to assigned errors.
- After state post-conviction proceedings, Smith sought federal habeas relief, asserting constitutional challenges to the use of the psychiatrist-derived statements at sentencing; the district court denied relief and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether Smith procedurally defaulted his federal constitutional challenge to the psychiatrist’s sentencing testimony by failing to raise it on direct appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia.
2. If default occurred, whether Smith established “cause and prejudice” to excuse the default.
3. Whether, absent cause, federal review was required to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that Smith procedurally defaulted the claim by not pressing it on direct appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia.
- The Court held Smith failed to show “cause” excusing the default because counsel’s omission was a deliberate tactical decision.
- The Court rejected the argument that counsel’s choice constituted ineffective assistance under *Strickland v. Washington*.
- The Court rejected “novelty” as cause because related constitutional theories had been developing in lower courts at the time of Smith’s appeal.
- The Court held the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception did not apply.
- Federal habeas review of the underlying constitutional claim was barred, and the lower courts’ denial of habeas relief was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- A state procedural default generally bars federal habeas review unless the petitioner shows (1) cause for the default and (2) actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional error.
- A deliberate, tactical decision by counsel to omit a claim on direct appeal is not “cause” sufficient to excuse procedural default.
- Attorney error amounts to “cause” only if it rises to constitutionally ineffective assistance under *Strickland*; a reasonable strategic omission does not qualify.
- “Novelty” excuses default only when the legal basis was not reasonably available at the time; it is insufficient where related arguments were already present in developing case law.
- The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is narrow and does not apply absent an extreme showing, typically tied to the reliability of the adjudication (such as actual innocence).

## Conclusion

The Court enforced Virginia’s appellate default rule to bar federal habeas review of Smith’s constitutional challenge to psychiatric-testimony evidence used at capital sentencing, holding that counsel’s strategic omission was not cause and that neither prejudice nor a miscarriage-of-justice exception justified reaching the merits.


Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986)