## Facts

- William R. Phillips, a New York City police officer, was tried in New York state court for two murders and an attempted murder.
- During trial, juror John Dana Smith applied for employment as a major-felony investigator in the same District Attorney’s Office prosecuting the case.
- Prosecutors learned more than a week before the verdict that a juror had applied for the job but chose not to inform the court or defense; they directed that no one contact the juror and that no further information about him be gathered during trial.
- The jury deliberated and returned guilty verdicts; alternate jurors were still available when deliberations began.
- After the verdict, the District Attorney disclosed the juror’s application to the court and defense.
- The trial judge held a post-trial evidentiary hearing; the juror testified he saw nothing improper in applying during trial.
- The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that the application and nondisclosure did not influence the verdict and that the juror remained able to decide the case solely on the evidence.
- State appellate courts affirmed the conviction.
- On federal habeas review, the district court found no actual bias but granted relief based on “imputed” bias; the Second Circuit affirmed on the theory that prosecutorial nondisclosure itself denied due process.

## Issues

1. Whether due process was violated because a sitting juror applied for employment with the prosecuting office during trial.
2. Whether due process was violated because prosecutors failed to disclose the juror’s application to the court and defense before the verdict.
3. Whether federal habeas courts may set aside state-court findings of juror impartiality absent convincing evidence rebutting those findings.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas relief.
- Due process did not require a new trial merely because a juror was placed in a potentially compromising situation.
- A post-trial hearing was an appropriate mechanism to determine whether the juror was actually biased.
- The state trial judge’s finding that the incident did not affect the verdict was entitled to a presumption of correctness on habeas review and was not rebutted by convincing evidence.
- The prosecutors’ nondisclosure did not render the trial fundamentally unfair; due process analysis turned on the fairness of the trial, not the prosecutors’ culpability.

## Legal Principles

- Due process is satisfied by a jury capable and willing to decide solely on the evidence and a trial judge vigilant to detect and assess prejudice when potentially prejudicial events occur.
- Due process does not mandate automatic reversal whenever a juror encounters a potentially compromising circumstance; the constitutionally required inquiry is whether actual bias affected the verdict.
- On federal habeas review, state-court factual findings (including findings bearing on juror impartiality) are presumptively correct and may be overcome only by convincing evidence.
- In claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the due process inquiry is whether the conduct made the trial unfair, not whether the prosecutor acted blameworthily.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the juror’s mid-trial job application to the prosecuting office and the prosecutors’ failure to disclose it before the verdict did not violate due process where the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing, found no prejudice, and that finding was not rebutted on federal habeas review.


Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982)