## Facts

- New York City maintained a rent-control regime intended to preserve affordable housing during a continuing housing emergency.
- Denise Sobel owned a four-story New York City rowhouse with multiple apartments, including two units subject to rent control.
- Under the City Rent and Rehabilitation Law (Administrative Code § 26-408) and the Rent and Eviction Regulations (9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.9), a landlord generally could not remove rent-controlled units from the rental market by evicting the protected tenants.
- The regulations allowed withdrawal or eviction only in limited, specified circumstances (including certain business uses, unsafe conditions, nonprofit needs, or “undue hardship”).
- The scheme’s hardship concept included an 8.5% net annual return benchmark tied to the property’s assessed value; agency relief depended on meeting statutory and regulatory criteria.
- Sobel did not claim that an agency had ruled against her in an eviction or withdrawal application. Instead, she asserted that seeking a certificate of eviction would be futile because she did not fit within any of the enumerated grounds and claimed there was no path for an owner who simply wanted to stop being a landlord “now and forever.”
- Sobel brought a declaratory-judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, naming as defendants Richard L. Higgins (Commissioner, New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal), Felice Michetti (Commissioner, NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development), and Robert Abrams (New York Attorney General).
- The complaint asserted multiple constitutional theories, including a claimed constitutional right to exit the rental business, physical and regulatory takings, involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment, and due process violations.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the Attorney General also sought dismissal on the ground that he was not a proper party because he did not enforce the challenged provisions.

## Issues

1. Whether the New York Attorney General was a proper party defendant in a declaratory action challenging rent-control provisions that he did not enforce.
2. Whether the complaint presented a justiciable controversy suitable for declaratory relief where the landlord had not pursued an administrative eviction/withdrawal application, claiming futility.
3. Whether the landlord stated a viable facial constitutional challenge—based on takings, due process, and the Thirteenth Amendment—by alleging that the rent-control scheme lacked any avenue for an owner to withdraw units solely to stop being a landlord.

## Decision

- The court dismissed the Attorney General as a named defendant because he was not charged with enforcing the challenged law or regulation, while recognizing his ability to appear to defend constitutionality.
- The court found an actual controversy sufficient for declaratory relief, treating Sobel’s claims as a facial challenge because there was no agency determination specific to her property.
- Applying the demanding standard for facial challenges, the court rejected Sobel’s constitutional attacks on the rent-control provisions and declined to recognize a constitutional right to evict rent-controlled tenants merely to withdraw from the rental market.
- The court rejected Sobel’s takings theories (including her attempt to characterize rent control as a compelled occupation), her due process claim, and her Thirteenth Amendment theory.
- The court disposed of the action by declaring the challenged provisions valid on their face and dismissing the complaint to the extent it sought contrary relief.

## Legal Principles

- In a declaratory-judgment action raising constitutional questions, dismissal is not required merely because the plaintiff may not obtain the declaration sought; the court may declare the parties’ rights based on the legal issue presented.
- A plaintiff who has not obtained an agency determination typically presents a facial, not as-applied, challenge; a facial challenge carries a heavy burden.
- A facial constitutional challenge requires showing that the law is invalid in all its applications (i.e., that there is no set of circumstances under which it can operate constitutionally).
- The Attorney General may defend the constitutionality of challenged enactments, but he is not a proper party defendant unless he has an enforcement role.
- Rent-control measures enacted to address a housing emergency are generally sustained as economic regulation within the police power so long as they are not confiscatory.
- Limits on withdrawal and eviction do not, by themselves, establish a compensable taking where the regulatory scheme includes defined grounds for relief and mechanisms tied to financial hardship or minimum-return concepts.
- Regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship does not amount to involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.
- Due process challenges to rent regulation are measured by whether the scheme is a rational means to serve a legitimate public purpose and whether the regulatory structure supplies meaningful standards for administration.

## Conclusion

*Sobel v. Higgins* held that a landlord’s facial constitutional challenge to New York City rent-control withdrawal and hardship provisions failed: the court dismissed the Attorney General as an improper party, found a justiciable controversy for declaratory relief despite the absence of an agency ruling, applied the stringent facial-challenge standard, and ultimately upheld the rent-control framework against takings, due process, and Thirteenth Amendment claims based on the asserted right to stop being a landlord.


Sobel v. Higgins, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1991)