## Facts

- Dayton Hudson Corp. (Target’s parent) required applicants for Target store security officer (SSO) jobs to take a pre-employment psychological test (“Psychscreen”) drawn from MMPI and CPI items.
- The SSO position involved observing, apprehending, and arresting suspected shoplifters; SSOs were unarmed but carried handcuffs and could use reasonable force in self-defense.
- The Psychscreen contained 704 true-false questions; completed answer sheets were sent to outside psychological consultants for scoring, and Target received only evaluative reports.
- Plaintiffs were rejected for SSO positions and sued on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of SSO applicants.
- Plaintiffs challenged particular test questions that facially probed religious beliefs/practices and sexual matters, alleging the questions were not necessary or closely related to SSO job duties.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the California Constitution’s privacy clause and related statutory and common-law theories.
- The trial court denied a preliminary injunction and denied class certification, emphasizing that Target did not receive raw answers and that individual answers had meaning only cumulatively.

## Issues

1. Whether compelling SSO applicants to answer psychological test questions that facially concern religion and sexual matters constitutes a serious invasion of privacy under the California Constitution.
2. Whether such compelled questioning, absent a narrow showing of job-related necessity, violates California statutory protections against discrimination and privacy intrusions in employment.
3. Whether plaintiffs met the standards for a preliminary injunction based on likelihood of success and the balance of harms.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying class certification given the commonality of the challenged testing practice.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held plaintiffs showed a sufficient likelihood of success that the challenged questions intruded on protected privacy interests and were not justified on the existing record as directly and narrowly job-related.
- The court treated the privacy injury as arising from compelled disclosure (or the forced choice between disclosure and employment opportunity), not from whether Target’s managers saw raw answers.
- The court remanded for reconsideration of class certification consistent with its legal analysis, without ordering immediate certification.

## Legal Principles

- The California Constitution protects privacy against unwarranted intrusions by private employers as well as the government, including in hiring practices.
- Information concerning religious belief/practice and sexual orientation/practices is within core privacy interests and may not be compelled in employment screening absent sufficient justification.
- For privacy-intrusive inquiries in employment testing, the employer must show the intrusion is justified by a legitimate, compelling interest and pursued through means that are directly and narrowly related to the employee’s duties.
- The presence of a generally valid psychological screening program does not automatically justify individual items that intrude into protected areas without a tight job-related rationale.
- In preliminary injunction analysis, compelled disclosure of constitutionally protected information as a condition of employment can constitute irreparable harm, supporting interim relief when less intrusive screening alternatives remain available.

## Conclusion

The court ordered preliminary injunctive relief because requiring applicants to answer psychological test questions about religion and sexual matters raised a serious privacy invasion not shown, on the record, to be directly and narrowly related to the duties of unarmed store security officers, and it remanded for reconsideration of class certification under that privacy framework.


Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)