## Facts

- John B. Flinn, Sr. created a testamentary trust of essentially his entire estate, naming Walter McNally as executor and trustee.
- The will gave the widow and the testator’s son beneficial life interests and provided that the grandson, Charles Flinn, would receive trust income until age 30 and then receive the trust corpus.
- After the testator’s death, the widow renounced the will’s provisions for her and elected to take a statutory “child’s part,” resulting in a one-half share because only one child survived.
- The son later died.
- Charles died intestate before reaching age 30 and before the widow died; Charles’s sole heir was his natural mother, Ruth Iona Sorrels.
- The will did not address the contingency of Charles dying before age 30 or before termination of the prior beneficial interests.
- McNally filed a suit for construction of the will seeking instructions on distribution of the trust corpus.
- The trial court decreed the widow entitled to the entire estate; Sorrels and her husband appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the grandson’s interest in the trust corpus was a vested remainder at the testator’s death or a contingent interest conditioned on attaining age 30.
2. If the grandson’s interest vested, whether it passed upon his death to his intestate heir (his mother) rather than reverting to the testator’s estate for distribution to the widow.
3. How the testator’s intent should be determined where the will is silent on the contingency that occurred.

## Decision

- The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions.
- The court held the grandson’s equitable interest in the trust corpus vested at the testator’s death; the age-30 provision fixed the time of enjoyment, not a condition of the gift.
- Because the interest was vested and transmissible, it passed at Charles’s death to his sole heir, Ruth Iona Sorrels.
- The widow was not entitled to the entire trust estate on a resulting-trust or reversion theory.

## Legal Principles

- The cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascertain and give effect to the testator’s intent, unless doing so would violate law or public policy.
- The testator’s intent is determined from the will as a whole, not from isolated words or clauses.
- Estates are presumed to vest at the testator’s death; an estate will not be treated as contingent absent clear, decisive language or necessity to carry other will provisions into effect.
- Language postponing distribution to a stated age generally indicates deferred possession of a vested gift unless the will makes survival to that age a condition precedent.
- A trustee takes only an estate commensurate with the powers and purposes of the trust; the trustee’s legal title does not create beneficial reversionary rights by implication.

## Conclusion

The court construed the will to effect the testator’s intent and applied a strong presumption favoring vesting, holding that the grandson’s remainder vested at the testator’s death and therefore passed upon the grandson’s pre-age-30 death to his mother as his sole heir, requiring reversal of the decree awarding the entire estate to the widow.


Sorrels v. McNally, 105 So. 106 (Fla. 1925)