## Facts

- J.W. Southworth and Joseph C. and Arlene G. Oliver were neighboring cattle ranchers in Bear Valley, Grant County, Oregon.
- In 1976, the Olivers decided to reduce their operation and sell a portion of their Bear Valley ranch on installment terms.
- After discussions in which Oliver asked whether Southworth would buy the ranch and Southworth agreed, Oliver told Southworth he would determine the value and terms and notify him.
- Southworth arranged financing and, in a later call, confirmed Oliver still intended to sell; Oliver affirmed.
- On June 17, 1976, Oliver sent Southworth a letter describing the sale of approximately 2,933 acres for $324,419, requiring a 29% down payment, with the balance payable over five years at 8% interest, and proposing a closing date of December 1, 1976 or January 1, 1977.
- The June 17 letter also referenced Forest Service grazing permits, which had been discussed separately and potentially involved another neighbor.
- On June 21, 1976, Southworth mailed a letter stating he accepted the land purchase on the terms stated.
- The Olivers responded that Southworth had misconstrued the June 17 letter, asserting it was not intended to create a binding contract.
- Southworth sued for declaratory relief and specific performance to compel conveyance of the land.
- The trial court entered a decree of specific performance; the Olivers appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the June 17, 1976 letter constituted a binding offer to sell the identified ranch land, rather than a nonbinding price quotation or invitation to negotiate.
2. Whether Southworth’s June 21, 1976 letter was a valid, unqualified acceptance forming a contract for the sale of land.
3. Whether the agreement was sufficiently definite and enforceable in equity, and whether a Statute of Frauds defense could defeat enforcement when raised for the first time on appeal.

## Decision

- The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decree of specific performance.
- The June 17 letter was an offer because it stated essential terms with sufficient specificity and was sent in the context of prior negotiations to a known, limited recipient.
- Southworth’s June 21 letter was a valid acceptance; omission of the grazing permits did not make the acceptance conditional because the permits were treated as separable from the land transaction.
- The contract was definite enough for specific performance; remaining details (including customary security for deferred payments) could be supplied by the court using standard terms.
- The Statute of Frauds defense was waived because it was not raised in the trial court.

## Legal Principles

- Contract formation is determined by an objective standard: whether a reasonable person in the offeree’s position would understand the communication, in context, as a commitment capable of acceptance.
- A detailed written communication identifying the property, price, payment structure, and timing, directed to a specific person or limited group after negotiations, may constitute an offer rather than an invitation to negotiate.
- An acceptance that unequivocally agrees to the offered land terms forms a contract even if it does not address separable, collateral items discussed elsewhere.
- For specific performance, a land sale contract is enforceable if essential terms are settled; courts may supply customary or reasonable ancillary terms when necessary to carry out the agreement.
- Affirmative defenses such as the Statute of Frauds must be timely raised in the trial court or they may be waived on appeal.

## Conclusion

The court enforced specific performance because the seller’s detailed letter, viewed objectively and in context, was an offer to sell identified land on stated terms, the buyer’s response was an unqualified acceptance, and the sellers could not defeat enforcement by raising a Statute of Frauds defense for the first time on appeal.


Southworth v. Oliver, 284 Or. 361, 587 P.2d 994 (Or. 1978)