## Facts

- A residential fire in New York City killed Sandra Speller and injured her seven-year-old son.
- The fire’s origin was undisputedly in the kitchen.
- Plaintiffs alleged the fire was caused by a defect in a refrigerator manufactured by Whirlpool and sold by Sears.
- The refrigerator area alleged to contain the defect (an upper-right wiring area) was destroyed, preventing direct identification of a specific defective component.
- Defendants contended the fire was caused by a stovetop grease fire and relied heavily on a Fire Marshal report reaching that conclusion.
- Plaintiffs offered expert evidence (depositions/affidavit) opining the fire originated in the refrigerator’s upper-right quadrant and rejecting the stove as the source.
- Plaintiffs also cited deposition testimony from a Whirlpool engineer who stated a fire would not occur in a refrigerator absent a defect, although he disputed that this fire began in the refrigerator.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs alleging a product defect may defeat summary judgment through circumstantial evidence when the product is destroyed and a specific defect cannot be identified.
2. Whether defendants’ evidence of an alternative cause (a stovetop grease fire) requires plaintiffs to prove a specific defect rather than proceed circumstantially.
3. Whether plaintiffs’ expert proof created a triable issue of fact on defect and causation.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the complaint against Sears and Whirlpool.
- The court held plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact that a defective refrigerator caused the fire.
- The court rejected a rule that an alternative-cause theory forces plaintiffs to identify a specific defect.
- Conflicting proof on the fire’s origin presented credibility and causation questions for a factfinder, not resolution on summary judgment.

## Legal Principles

- A product defect may be proven by circumstantial evidence when direct proof of a specific defect is unavailable.
- An inference of defect is permitted where (1) the event is of a kind that ordinarily occurs due to a product defect, and (2) the event was not solely the result of causes other than product defect.
- A defendant’s alternative-cause explanation does not bar circumstantial proof; it presents a factual dispute that plaintiffs may meet with evidence tending to negate the alternative cause.
- Summary judgment is improper where competing expert evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to infer defect and causation.

## Conclusion

The court held that plaintiffs’ expert evidence, together with testimony supporting an inference that a refrigerator fire implies defect, was sufficient to allow a jury to decide whether the refrigerator was defective and caused the kitchen fire, notwithstanding defendants’ grease-fire theory and supporting report.


Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.Y.2d 38 (N.Y. 2003)