## Facts

- Congress authorized election regulations for the District of Columbia that limited the franchise to “male citizens” and made registration a condition precedent to voting.
- Sara S. Spencer, a woman citizen and resident of the United States and the District of Columbia, tendered herself for registration and was refused solely because she was a woman.
- Sarah E. Webster, also a woman citizen and resident of the United States and the District of Columbia, attempted to vote, and her ballot was rejected solely because she was a woman.
- Each plaintiff alleged she met all qualifications other than sex and had complied with applicable procedures for registration and voting.
- Spencer sued election officials under § 2 of the federal Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870 for refusal to register; Webster sued under § 3 for rejection of her vote.
- Defendants filed general demurrers, presenting the legal question whether the Constitution (primarily the Fourteenth Amendment) gave women citizens the right to vote notwithstanding the “male citizens” limitation.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship, privileges or immunities, due process, or equal protection provisions confer the elective franchise on women citizens and bar sex-based voting restrictions in the District of Columbia.
2. Whether Congress, when organizing the District’s government and election system, could constitutionally limit suffrage to male citizens.

## Decision

- The court sustained the demurrers and dismissed both actions.
- The court held the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer a right of suffrage on women.
- The court upheld the District’s “male citizens” voting limitation as within congressional authority over the District.
- The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection as grounds for invalidating sex-based voter qualifications.

## Legal Principles

- Citizenship, standing alone, does not entail a constitutional right to vote; suffrage may be restricted by qualifications not coextensive with citizenship.
- The elective franchise is not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Absent explicit constitutional text prohibiting a particular voting qualification, voter eligibility rules remain subject to legislative determination; the Constitution’s specific voting prohibitions (e.g., later race-based limits) indicate suffrage restrictions are addressed expressly when intended.
- Sex-based restrictions on voting were treated as political classifications not invalidated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process or equal protection provisions as applied in this case.
- Congress’s constitutional power to legislate for the District of Columbia includes authority to define voter qualifications for District elections, unless expressly limited by the Constitution.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that women’s federal citizenship did not carry a constitutional right to be registered or to vote in the District of Columbia, and it sustained election regulations limiting the franchise to male citizens, dismissing statutory claims for refusal to register and rejection of ballots.


Spencer v. Bd. of Registration; Webster v. Superintendents of Election, 8 D.C. (1 MacArthur) 169 (D.C. 1873)