PastPaperHero | Nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher

Learning Outcomes

This article examines 'non-natural use' of land within private nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, including:

The distinction between natural and non-natural uses of land, and why this categorisation matters for strict liability claims
Judicial factors for determining non-natural use, such as quantity, magnitude of risk, locality, purpose, and contemporary standards
The significance of non-natural use for establishing liability under Rylands v Fletcher and its relationship with private nuisance
The requirements of accumulation and escape, and how they confine liability to escapes from land to neighbouring property
The modern high threshold for non-natural use, the need for exceptional risk, and the impact of leading cases
The limitation of Rylands liability to damage to land and property interests, excluding recovery for personal injury losses
The foreseeability requirement as to the type of damage, aligning Rylands with modern remoteness principles in tort law
Distinctions between Rylands v Fletcher, private nuisance, and negligence, and how each may be examined in SQE1 problem questions
Key defences to Rylands v Fletcher, including act of a stranger, act of God, consent/common benefit, and statutory authority

SQE1 Syllabus

For SQE1, you are required to understand the principles of liability under private nuisance and the specific rule established in Rylands v Fletcher, including identifying the key elements of each tort, particularly how the concept of 'non-natural use' affects liability under Rylands v Fletcher, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

The definition and elements of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
The specific requirement for a 'non-natural use' of land under this rule.
Factors considered by courts when determining if a use is 'non-natural', such as the quantity of the substance accumulated, the magnitude of risk, and whether the use is ordinary or extraordinary.
Distinguishing 'non-natural use' under Rylands from 'unreasonable interference' in private nuisance.
Applying these principles to determine potential liability in SQE1 scenarios.
The escape and accumulation requirements and the limitation of Rylands liability to property damage.
The modern approach in cases such as Rickards v Lothian, Cambridge Water, Transco, Read v Lyons, and Stannard v Gore.
Relevant defences to Rylands: act of a stranger, act of God, consent/common benefit, and statutory authority.

Test Your Knowledge

Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.

Which element distinguishes the rule in Rylands v Fletcher from general private nuisance regarding the defendant's use of land?
1. The interference must be continuous.
2. The use of land must be unreasonable.
3. The use of land must be non-natural.
4. The claimant must have a proprietary interest.
Which case is the primary authority for the rule imposing strict liability for the escape of dangerous things accumulated under non-natural use?
1. St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping
2. Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc
3. Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd
4. Rylands v Fletcher
True or False? Domestic plumbing systems involving water pipes are generally considered a 'non-natural use' of land for the purposes of Rylands v Fletcher.

Introduction

Understanding liability for interference emanating from land requires knowledge of both private nuisance and the specific rule derived from Rylands v Fletcher. While private nuisance addresses unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land, Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability for damage caused by the escape of something likely to do mischief, which was brought onto land as part of a 'non-natural use'. This article focuses specifically on the concept of 'non-natural use' and its importance in applying the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

Rylands v Fletcher sits close to private nuisance, but the two torts are distinct. Modern authorities confirm Rylands is a specialised form of strict liability, tightly confined to cases where there is an escape from land to land and where the damage is to property interests. The threshold for non-natural use is high and context-dependent, reflecting contemporary standards and practices.

The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher

The rule established in Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability on an occupier of land for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous thing that they brought onto their land and accumulated. It is often described as a sub-species of nuisance, but its elements are specific and operate independently of fault.

Key Term: Rule in Rylands v Fletcher
A tort imposing strict liability on an occupier for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous thing accumulated on their land during a non-natural use.

For liability under this rule to arise, several elements must be established:

The defendant brings onto their land and collects/keeps there something likely to do mischief if it escapes.
The defendant makes a 'non-natural use' of the land.
The thing accumulated escapes from the defendant's land.
The escape causes foreseeable damage of the relevant type.

This article concentrates on the second element: non-natural use of land. Note also two important constraints: first, there must be an escape (a movement from the defendant’s land to the claimant’s land), and second, Rylands liability is confined to damage to land or property; personal injury is not recoverable under this tort. Both constraints have been reaffirmed in modern case law.

Key Term: Accumulation
The deliberate bringing onto land and keeping/collecting of a substance or thing; it does not include what naturally occurs on the land.

Key Term: Escape
Movement of the thing from the defendant’s land to the claimant’s land; injury or damage confined to the defendant’s land does not meet the escape requirement.

Key Term: Dangerous thing likely to do mischief
A substance or thing which, if it escapes, is likely to cause harm; danger may arise from the quantity or circumstances even if the thing is not inherently dangerous.

Non-Natural Use of Land

The requirement that the defendant's use of land must be 'non-natural' is a key component of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and serves to limit the scope of this strict liability tort.

Key Term: Non-natural use
A use of land that is extraordinary, unusual, or special, bringing with it increased danger to others, beyond the risks associated with ordinary use of land in a particular locality at a particular time.

The concept originated with Lord Cairns' judgment in the House of Lords decision in Rylands v Fletcher itself, where constructing a large reservoir was implicitly treated as non-natural. Subsequent case law has refined the meaning. In Rickards v Lothian, “non-natural” was described as “some special use bringing with it increased danger to others.” Modern courts have further emphasised that the threshold is high: the risk must be exceptional in the context of contemporary standards.

Key Term: Foreseeability of damage (Rylands)
The damage must be of a type that was reasonably foreseeable if the dangerous thing escaped; this limits strict liability to harm that was within the reasonable contemplation given the activity and circumstances.

Determining Non-Natural Use

Whether a particular use of land is 'non-natural' is a question of fact determined by the court based on all the circumstances. Key factors include:

Ordinary vs Extraordinary Use: The central question is whether the use is ordinary and routine or if it is special and unusual. Domestic water supply pipes, for instance, were held to be a natural use of land (Rickards v Lothian; Transco plc v Stockport MBC). In contrast, storing large quantities of industrial chemicals might be considered non-natural (Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc). Courts look at how commonplace the activity is in the locality and at the time, and whether it increases danger beyond ordinary land use.
Magnitude of Risk: A use that creates an exceptionally high risk of danger if something escapes is more likely to be deemed non-natural (Transco plc v Stockport MBC). This involves assessing both the likelihood and potential severity of harm. The modern test emphasises exceptional danger: the thing and circumstances must create a risk that is out of the ordinary, and this exceptional danger is often the decisive factor.
Quantity: Accumulating very large quantities of a substance, even if not inherently dangerous (like water in Rylands), can render the use non-natural due to the increased danger posed by the quantity. Bulk storage frequently elevates ordinary materials into exceptional risks.
Context and Time: What constitutes non-natural use can change over time and depends on contemporary standards and practices (Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd; Rickards v Lothian). Storage of petrol in a car’s tank in a garage might have been non-natural in 1919 (Musgrove v Pandelis) but is clearly natural today. Courts explicitly assess non-natural use by reference to modern conditions, technology, and societal expectations.
Purpose and Benefit: The fact that an activity serves a useful function or even public benefit does not of itself make a use natural. Public benefit may affect remedies (e.g., damages instead of an injunction in nuisance), but it is not determinative of non-natural use under Rylands.
Control and Setting: Activities essential to the ordinary operation of premises (e.g., standard plumbing within residential blocks) are unlikely to be non-natural. Conversely, industrial operations involving hazardous processes or materials may cross the threshold, particularly if the risk is exceptional and the quantities significant.

The court’s analysis is comprehensive. An activity can be widespread yet still non-natural in an individual case if the quantity or arrangements create an exceptional danger beyond ordinary land use. Conversely, a potentially hazardous material may be a natural use if kept in small quantities and in ordinary settings.

Contrast with Natural Use

The rule does not apply to things naturally present on the land (e.g., naturally occurring water bodies, thistles, trees). It also does not apply to ordinary uses of land, such as domestic wiring, plumbing (Rickards v Lothian; Transco), or typical agricultural practices. The essential distinction lies in whether the activity introduces a special or increased risk beyond the norm for that type of land use. Natural use encompasses contemporary, routine uses that align with the ordinary incidents of occupation.

Examples:

Ordinary domestic water distribution within a building: natural use (Transco).
Ordinary car storage with fuel in its tank today: natural use.
Bulk storage of flammable solvents on industrial premises: potentially non-natural, given quantity and risk (Cambridge Water).

Worked Example 1.1

A factory stores large metal drums containing industrial solvents essential for its manufacturing process. The factory is located on an industrial estate. Due to negligent storage, some drums leak, and the solvent escapes onto neighbouring land, damaging sensitive crops. Is the storage of these solvents likely to be considered a non-natural use of land under Rylands v Fletcher?

Answer:
Potentially yes. While operating a factory on an industrial estate is normal, storing large quantities of potentially hazardous industrial solvents might be considered a use bringing increased danger beyond the ordinary. The court would consider the quantity, the innate danger of the solvents if they escape, and whether such storage is common practice on similar estates. The fact it's an industrial estate is relevant but not decisive; the specific activity (large-scale chemical storage) might still be deemed non-natural due to the heightened risk (Cambridge Water). The damage must also be of a type reasonably foreseeable if solvent escaped (e.g., contamination requiring relocation of water source or harm to crops).

Worked Example 1.2

A homeowner installs a large decorative fish pond in their back garden, using a heavy-duty liner and circulating pump system. Following exceptionally heavy rainfall, the pond overflows, and water escapes into a neighbour's garden, flooding their shed. Is the creation of the garden pond a non-natural use?

Answer:
Unlikely. Creating a garden pond, even a large one, is generally considered an ordinary and natural use of a residential garden. It doesn't typically involve accumulating something inherently dangerous in a way that creates an exceptional risk beyond normal domestic activities. The escape was due to rainfall, potentially raising the defence of Act of God if the rainfall was truly exceptional and unforeseeable. The use itself is likely 'natural' (Rickards v Lothian principle).

Worked Example 1.3

A local authority’s buried water main serving flats bursts due to an undetected defect, causing subsidence in an embankment and exposing a nearby gas main. Emergency remedial works are required to protect the gas infrastructure. Is the presence of the water main a non-natural use for Rylands liability?

Answer:
No. Supplying water via domestic mains is an ordinary and natural use of land. Pipes carrying water for domestic supply do not, without more, amount to non-natural use. The high threshold for non-natural use is not met, and Rylands liability would not arise (Transco plc v Stockport MBC). Other causes of action (e.g., negligence) might be explored depending on evidence of fault, but Rylands is inapplicable.

Worked Example 1.4

A tyre wholesaler stores thousands of tyres in a warehouse. An accidental fire breaks out and spreads to neighbouring property. Can Rylands v Fletcher be used against the wholesaler?

Answer:
Unlikely on these facts. The thing brought onto the land was tyres; the escape was of fire, not the tyres themselves. Rylands focuses on the escape of the thing accumulated. Tyres are not themselves likely to do mischief if they escape, and here the mischief resulted from fire rather than the tyres escaping. Liability in Rylands was rejected in similar circumstances (Stannard v Gore). Other claims (e.g., negligence or nuisance) might be possible depending on storage arrangements and precautions.

Worked Example 1.5

A quarry operator uses explosives to free rock. During blasting, fragments of rock are propelled onto neighbouring land, damaging structures. Is the activity a non-natural use for Rylands, and has there been an escape?

Answer:
Potentially yes. Explosives are a dangerous thing, and blasting that propels rock off-site can satisfy both accumulation (explosives for blasting) and escape (rocks leaving the land). Courts have treated escape of debris caused by explosives as capable of falling within Rylands (e.g., earlier authorities such as Miles v Forest Rock Granite). The risk profile and method of use will be closely examined; negligence and nuisance may also arise.

Significance of Non-Natural Use

Establishing non-natural use is essential for a claim under Rylands v Fletcher. If the use is deemed natural, the claim under this specific rule fails. However, liability might still arise under negligence or private nuisance (if the interference is unreasonable and ongoing).

Key modern limits:

Escape requirement: There must be a movement of the dangerous thing from the defendant’s land to the claimant’s land. Injury within the defendant’s land (e.g., an explosion in a factory injuring an inspector on site) does not suffice (Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd).
Type of damage: Rylands liability is confined to damage to land and property interests. Personal injury claims must be brought under negligence or other torts, not Rylands (Cambridge Water; Transco).
Foreseeability of type of harm: Even though liability is strict, the damage must be of a type reasonably foreseeable if the dangerous thing escaped (Cambridge Water). This aligns Rylands with modern principles of remoteness and limits strict liability to foreseeable categories of damage.
Defences: Standard defences may defeat liability: act of a stranger (e.g., malicious third-party interference), act of God (exceptional natural events), consent/common benefit, and statutory authority. These limit strict liability where the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to prevent the cause of the escape or where the activity is authorised.

Key Term: Strict Liability
Liability imposed without the need to prove fault (such as negligence or intention) on the part of the defendant. Under Rylands v Fletcher, if the elements are met, the defendant is liable even if they took reasonable care to prevent the escape, subject to the modern constraints of escape, foreseeability of type of damage, and applicable defences.

Exam Warning

Do not confuse 'non-natural use' under Rylands v Fletcher with 'unreasonable interference' in private nuisance. A use of land might be perfectly natural (e.g., keeping pigs) but still cause an unreasonable interference (e.g., excessive smell) amounting to nuisance. Conversely, a non-natural use (e.g., bulk storage of chemicals) might only lead to Rylands liability if there is an escape causing damage; it doesn't automatically constitute nuisance without unreasonable interference. Also remember the escape requirement and that personal injury is not recoverable under Rylands.

Key Point Checklist

This article has covered the following key knowledge points:

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability for damage caused by the escape of dangerous things accumulated during a non-natural use of land.
'Non-natural use' is a key element required for liability under Rylands v Fletcher and carries a high threshold in modern law.
Non-natural use refers to a use that is extraordinary, unusual, or brings increased danger beyond ordinary uses of land; quantity and exceptional risk are important.
Determining non-natural use is fact-specific, considering factors like quantity, risk, ordinariness, and context.
Activities naturally occurring on land or ordinary domestic/industrial uses are generally not considered non-natural (e.g., domestic water pipes).
Liability under Rylands v Fletcher requires an escape from the defendant’s land to the claimant’s land; damage confined to the defendant’s land does not suffice.
Rylands liability is confined to property damage; personal injury is not recoverable under this tort.
The damage must be of a type reasonably foreseeable if the dangerous thing escaped.
Applicable defences include act of a stranger, act of God (in narrow, exceptional circumstances), consent/common benefit, and statutory authority.
'Non-natural use' (Rylands) is distinct from 'unreasonable interference' (nuisance), and strict liability is distinct from negligence.

Key Terms and Concepts

Rule in Rylands v Fletcher
Non-natural use
Strict Liability
Accumulation
Escape
Dangerous thing likely to do mischief
Foreseeability of damage (Rylands)

Nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher - Non-natural us...