Nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher - Private nuisan...

Learning Outcomes

This article explores the tort of private nuisance and the related rule in Rylands v Fletcher. It details the elements required to establish liability for unreasonable interference with land use and enjoyment, and the distinct requirements for liability following an escape of dangerous things from land. It explains who has standing to sue and who may be sued, the factors used to assess reasonableness (including locality, duration, sensitivity, and malice), how foreseeability limits recoverable damage, and how adoption or continuation of a nuisance leads to liability. It also covers the effect (and limits) of planning permission, the range of defences available in both areas, and the principal remedies of damages, injunctions and abatement. After reading this article, you should be able to identify the core principles of private nuisance, distinguish it from other torts like public nuisance and trespass, understand the specific conditions for applying the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, and recognise the available defences and remedies for both, including when strict liability applies and how courts approach discretionary relief.

SQE1 Syllabus

For SQE1, you are required to understand private nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and to apply the law correctly to given scenarios, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

• The elements required to establish a claim in private nuisance, including unreasonable interference and who has standing to sue.
• Factors determining 'unreasonable use' of land, such as locality, duration, sensitivity, and malice.
• The role of foreseeability/remoteness in nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher, particularly after Cambridge Water and Transco.
• Adoption and continuation of a nuisance, and occupier liability for nuisances created by trespassers, predecessors or natural causes.
• The limits of planning permission and environmental permitting: not statutory authority, but potentially relevant to locality and remedies.
• Available defences to private nuisance, such as prescription and statutory authority, plus consent, contributory negligence, act of God/stranger, and necessity.
• Remedies for private nuisance, primarily damages and injunctions (including when damages in lieu of injunction may be awarded) and abatement.
• The specific elements required for liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, including accumulation, non-natural use, escape, and foreseeable damage.
• Defences applicable to a claim under Rylands v Fletcher and the typical remedy of damages (personal injury not recoverable).
• Distinguishing private nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher from public nuisance and trespass to land.

Test Your Knowledge

Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.

1. Which of the following claimants is most likely to have standing to sue in private nuisance?
   1. A guest staying overnight at a property affected by noise.
   2. A tenant leasing the property affected by smells.
   3. A child living with their parents in the affected property.
   4. A contractor working temporarily at the affected property.

2. True or False: Physical damage to the claimant's property is always required to establish private nuisance.

3. What is the key requirement added by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher?
   1. Malice on the part of the defendant.
   2. That the escape must be continuous.
   3. That the damage caused by the escape must be reasonably foreseeable.
   4. That the claimant must have 'come to the nuisance'.
4. Which defence is available for private nuisance but generally not for public nuisance?
   1. Statutory authority.
   2. Prescription.
   3. Consent.
   4. Act of God.

Introduction

The law of tort protects various interests, including the use and enjoyment of land. Private nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher are two specific torts focused on this area. Private nuisance deals with indirect and unreasonable interferences, while the rule in Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability for the escape of dangerous things brought onto land. Understanding these torts, their elements, defences, and remedies is essential for advising clients whose property rights are affected or who face potential liability for their land use. This article will focus on these two related areas, distinguishing them from public nuisance and trespass to land.

Private nuisance and public nuisance are conceptually distinct. Private nuisance protects interests in land and requires unlawful interference with use or enjoyment or physical damage; it is ordinarily concerned with continuing states of affairs between neighbours. Public nuisance, by contrast, addresses unreasonable interference affecting a class of the public and does not require a proprietary interest. Trespass to land is also different: it protects possession against direct and intentional intrusions, whereas nuisance addresses indirect effects (for example, noise, smells or encroaching roots) and does not require proof of fault, only that the interference is substantial and unreasonable.

Private Nuisance

Private nuisance is concerned with protecting a person's right to use and enjoy their land, free from unlawful interference by neighbours or others. It is distinct from trespass, which involves direct physical entry onto land, and public nuisance, which affects a class of people rather than an individual landowner.

Key Term: Private Nuisance
An unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it.

An interference must be both substantial and unreasonable to be actionable. The interference may take several forms, including encroachment onto the claimant’s land (such as tree roots), direct physical injury to land (such as flooding, smoke or vibrations), or interference with amenity (such as noise, smells, dust or vibration). Amenity interferences protect ordinary comfort, not elevated preferences. Contemporary luxuries like TV or satellite reception are not actionable interferences when the loss results from a fixed structure’s presence.

Who Can Sue?

Historically, only those with a legal interest in the land (e.g., owners, tenants in exclusive possession) could sue in private nuisance. This principle was affirmed in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, which held that individuals without a proprietary interest, such as licensees (e.g., family members, lodgers, guests), could not bring a claim. The tort protects the utility of the land, not the personal comfort of individuals separate from their interest in the land.

A beneficial owner or tenant with exclusive possession has the requisite proprietary interest. By contrast, hotel guests, contractors, and children in the household do not. Standing is not expanded merely because the interference causes discomfort or personal harm; nuisance remains a land-based tort. Where interference causes personal injury, claims should be framed in negligence or public nuisance.

In modern practice, encroachment through vegetation has been litigated extensively. For example, Japanese knotweed encroachment may constitute a nuisance by materially interfering with enjoyment and causing or risking physical damage to structures; liability turns on awareness and failure to take reasonable steps to abate once the occupier knows or ought to know of the problem.

Who Can Be Sued?

Liability can fall upon:

1. The Creator: The person who originally creates the nuisance, even if they no longer occupy the land from which it emanates. A creator remains liable for damage caused by their earlier acts, subject to remoteness.

2. The Occupier: The current occupier of the land from which the nuisance originates is typically liable. This includes:

   • Liability for nuisances created by employees (vicarious liability).
   • Liability for independent contractors where the work carries a special danger of nuisance (for example, extensive building works where dust, noise or vibrations are inevitable unless special precautions are taken).
   • Liability where the occupier has ‘adopted’ or ‘continued’ a nuisance created by trespassers, predecessors, visitors or natural events (Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880). Adopting involves making use of the thing causing the nuisance; continuing involves failing to take reasonable steps to abate it once aware (or reasonably should be aware) of its existence. Courts will assess what steps were reasonable in light of the occupier’s resources and the nature of the hazard, particularly where the nuisance arises from nature (Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485).

3. The Landlord: A landlord may be liable if they expressly or impliedly authorised the nuisance by letting the property for a purpose that inevitably causes nuisance (Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663), or if they knew or ought to have known of a nuisance existing at the outset of the tenancy and failed to address it, or where they covenanted to repair (or had a right to enter to repair) and failed to do so.

The occupier’s liability extends to natural hazards that they have adopted or continued. For example, encroaching tree roots damaging foundations can lead to liability once the occupier is aware of the risk and fails to act (Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2001] UKHL 55). Similarly, failure to address invasive plants like Japanese knotweed can be a continuing nuisance once awareness and control are established.

Unlawful Interference

For an interference to be actionable, it must be deemed unlawful, meaning it is both substantial and unreasonable. Trivial interferences are not sufficient. The law seeks to balance the right of an occupier to use their land as they wish against the right of their neighbour to enjoy their land without interference.

Key Term: Unlawful Interference
An interference that is substantial (more than trivial) and unreasonable in all the circumstances.

The concept of reasonableness is central. It is judged objectively, considering what is normal and acceptable in the particular context. Factors influencing reasonableness include:

1. Nature of the Locality: The character of the neighbourhood is relevant, especially for amenity nuisances (noise, smell, dust). What constitutes a nuisance in a quiet residential area might be acceptable in an industrial zone (Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852). However, locality is generally irrelevant if the nuisance causes physical damage to property (St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642). Planning permission does not automatically change the character of a locality but can be a factor (Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13). Environmental permitting similarly does not authorise a private nuisance; it may provide context but does not displace private rights.

2. Duration and Frequency: Continuous or frequently recurring interferences are more likely to be considered unreasonable than temporary or isolated incidents. However, even temporary interference can be a nuisance if it is substantial (for example, night-time pile driving, De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd v Spicer Bros (1914) 30 TLR 257). Duration, frequency and timing (such as early mornings or night-time) significantly affect reasonableness.

3. Utility of the Defendant's Conduct: The social value or public benefit of the defendant's activity is not a defence to liability but can influence the choice of remedy (for example, damages in lieu of injunction where stopping a socially valuable activity would be oppressive).

4. Abnormal Sensitivity: If the claimant's use of land is abnormally sensitive, the interference might not be unreasonable if it would not affect a normal user (Robinson v Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch D 88). If the interference would affect an ordinary user, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the claimant's loss even if exacerbated by sensitivity (McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] 3 DLR 577).

5. Malice: If the defendant acts with malice or spite, an otherwise reasonable activity may become unreasonable and actionable (Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316; Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468).

6. Reasonable Care is Not Dispositive: The focus is on the reasonableness of the interference, not the defendant’s care. A defendant may be liable despite having taken reasonable care if the interference is objectively unreasonable. Conversely, negligence standards are not determinative in nuisance.

Key Term: Reasonable User
The principle that the law balances the defendant's right to use their land against the claimant's right to enjoy their land without undue interference, based on what is considered reasonable in society.

In all cases, remoteness limits recovery. Damage must be of a kind that is reasonably foreseeable. Although private nuisance is not fault-based, the type of loss must be foreseeable to be recoverable. Courts will reject claims where the damage is too remote, aligning nuisance with negligence principles of foreseeability and remoteness.

Worked Example 1.1

Amelia operates a small bakery from her home in a quiet village. Her neighbour, Ben, recently started keeping several cockerels which crow loudly from 4 am every morning, significantly disrupting Amelia's sleep and affecting her ability to concentrate on her baking.

Is Ben's activity likely to constitute an unreasonable interference?

Answer:
Yes, this is likely to be an unreasonable interference. Factors include the nature of the locality (quiet village), the time and frequency of the noise (early morning, daily), and the impact on Amelia's enjoyment of her property and her business. Keeping cockerels might be normal in a rural setting, but the noise level and timing could render it unreasonable here. The utility of keeping cockerels is unlikely to outweigh the substantial interference.

Foreseeability and Remoteness

In both nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, the type of damage must be reasonably foreseeable to be recoverable. This requirement, articulated for Rylands v Fletcher in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264, aligns nuisance with general tort principles of remoteness. For amenity nuisance, foreseeability often tracks what an ordinary neighbour would reasonably anticipate as the consequence of the defendant’s land use. Where physical damage occurs, foreseeability is usually more straightforward; locality does not mitigate liability for property damage.

Local Authority Permits and Planning

Planning permission or environmental permits do not confer statutory authority to commit a nuisance. They may inform the assessment of locality (particularly for amenity claims) and the appropriate remedy (for example, damages in lieu of an injunction where the activity is long-standing and regulated) but cannot of themselves legalise a nuisance. The conditions attached to planning permissions may be relevant in assessing the extent of reasonable noise or hours of operation, and breach of those conditions may support the conclusion that the interference is unreasonable.

Natural Hazards and Positive Duties

Where hazards arise naturally (subsidence, floods, encroaching roots or invasive plants), occupiers may acquire duties to take reasonable steps once they know or ought to know of the risk and its potential to cause nuisance to neighbours. Liability rests on adoption or continuation, and courts consider the occupier’s means and the practicality of measures required to abate the nuisance. A failure to act can render the occupier liable for ongoing harm.

Worked Example 1.2

Sofia owns a specialist print studio that requires high humidity to prevent paper shrinkage. Her neighbour installs a new ventilation system that dries the air in Sofia’s studio, reducing paper weight and damaging stock. Evidence shows that ordinary paper stored for ordinary purposes would not be affected by the neighbour’s system.

Is Sofia likely to succeed in private nuisance?

Answer:
No. This is likely to be abnormal sensitivity: the interference would not affect an ordinary user. The law assesses reasonableness by reference to ordinary use. If ordinary paper use would not be affected, the interference is not unlawful. If ordinary users would be affected, Sofia could recover the full extent of her loss, even if exacerbated by her sensitivity.

Worked Example 1.3

A motorsport venue in a semi-rural area has planning permission with conditions limiting race days and noise levels. The venue operates most weekends late into the evening. Nearby residents complain of persistent noise, including outside permitted hours.

Can the residents bring a private nuisance claim, and how does planning permission affect the analysis?

Answer:
Yes, residents can sue in private nuisance. Planning permission is not a defence. It may inform locality assessment and remedy. Breach of conditions undermines any claim that the noise is reasonable. The court may grant an injunction tailored to noise limits or award damages in lieu, considering public interest and whether limiting operations would be oppressive.

Defences to Private Nuisance

Several defences may be available:

1. Prescription: If the nuisance has been actionable by the claimant (or their predecessors) for a continuous period of 20 years without complaint, the defendant may acquire a prescriptive right to continue the activity. The time runs from when the activity becomes a nuisance to the claimant, not from when the activity started (Sturges v Bridgman).

2. Statutory Authority: If an activity is authorised by statute, and the nuisance is an inevitable consequence of that activity carried out without negligence, this provides a complete defence (Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001). Planning permission alone is not statutory authority.

3. Consent (Volenti non fit injuria): If the claimant expressly or impliedly consented to the nuisance. Consent must be clear and informed; mere tolerance does not necessarily amount to consent.

4. Contributory Negligence: If the claimant contributed to the damage suffered, damages may be reduced. This is a partial defence affecting quantum, not liability.

5. Act of God/Nature: An occupier is generally not liable for nuisances caused by natural events unless they adopt or continue the nuisance by failing to take reasonable steps. The defence is narrow; extraordinary natural phenomena may qualify, but ordinary weather patterns or rainfall typically do not (Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556).

6. Act of a Third Party/Trespasser: An occupier is not liable for a nuisance created by a third party (like a trespasser) unless they adopt or continue it. Reasonable inspection and maintenance can be relevant in determining liability where trespassers or strangers cause the nuisance.

7. Necessity: In rare cases, actions taken to prevent imminent and serious danger to life or limb (and sometimes property) may excuse what would otherwise be a nuisance, provided the defendant did not create the danger (Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum [1956] AC 218).

Note: It is not a defence that the claimant 'came to the nuisance' (i.e., moved to the area knowing the activity was ongoing). Nor is public benefit generally a defence, though it can affect the remedy granted.

Remedies for Private Nuisance

The primary remedies are:

1. Injunction: An order requiring the defendant to stop (prohibitory) or take steps to reduce (mandatory) the nuisance. This is an equitable remedy granted at the court's discretion, usually where damages are inadequate. Courts consider the Shelfer guidelines (Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287) but apply them flexibly (Coventry v Lawrence). Factors include the scale of harm, whether damages can adequately compensate, and whether an injunction would be oppressive. Public interest and planning context may be relevant.

2. Damages: Monetary compensation for physical damage to property or diminution in its value, and for loss of amenity (interference with enjoyment). Damages may be awarded in lieu of an injunction to compensate for future interference, especially where an injunction would be oppressive or contrary to the public interest.

3. Abatement: Self-help remedy where the claimant takes steps to stop the nuisance (e.g., trimming overhanging branches). Notice to the defendant may be required if entry onto their land is necessary. Abatement must be proportionate and careful; wrongful abatement can incur liability.

Key Term: Abatement
A self-help remedy allowing the claimant to remove or reduce a nuisance, subject to reasonable notice (if entry is needed) and limits on trespass and damage.

Worked Example 1.4

Luke’s neighbour’s tree branches overhang Luke’s driveway, scraping his car. After asking the neighbour to prune them, Luke cuts only the overhanging branches from his side without entering the neighbour’s land, and places the cut branches back on the neighbour’s property.

Is Luke’s abatement lawful, and what precautions should he take?

Answer:
Yes. Cutting overhanging branches on Luke’s side without entering the neighbour’s land is a lawful exercise of abatement. The cut branches belong to the neighbour and should be returned. If entry is required to abate a nuisance, Luke should give reasonable notice and avoid unnecessary damage.

Exam Warning

Remember that private nuisance protects interests in land. Claims for personal injury are generally not recoverable in private nuisance; negligence is the appropriate tort. Focus on interference with use/enjoyment or physical damage to the land itself. Amenity interferences (noise, smells, dust) are actionable without physical damage if sufficiently substantial and unreasonable. The type of damage must be reasonably foreseeable; remote or unusual loss is not recoverable.

The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher

This rule imposes strict liability (liability without proof of fault) in specific circumstances involving the escape of dangerous things from land. It originated from the case Rylands v Fletcher [1868] LR 3 HL 330.

Key Term: Rylands v Fletcher
A rule imposing strict liability on an occupier who brings onto their land and accumulates something likely to do mischief if it escapes, provided the use of land is non-natural and the escape causes foreseeable damage of the relevant type.

Rylands v Fletcher is a specialised form of nuisance. While nuisance typically concerns ongoing interference, Rylands addresses isolated escapes of dangerous things from land used in a non-natural way. Its scope has been limited by modern cases that emphasise exceptional risk, non-natural use, and foreseeability.

Elements of the Rule

To establish liability under Rylands v Fletcher, the claimant must prove:

1. Accumulation: The defendant must voluntarily bring onto their land and accumulate (collect and keep) something likely to do mischief if it escapes. Naturally occurring things are generally excluded unless the defendant has collected or maintained them for their purposes (for example, large reservoirs or stored chemicals).

2. Non-Natural Use: The defendant's use of the land must be considered 'non-natural'. This means a special use bringing with it increased danger to others, beyond the ordinary use of land (Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263). Modern authority emphasises that non-natural use involves an exceptionally high risk if escape occurs (Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61). Domestic utilities (like a household water supply) are ordinarily natural uses, whereas storing substantial quantities of chemicals or maintaining large reservoirs may be non-natural.

3. Likely to Do Mischief if it Escapes: The accumulated substance need not be inherently dangerous, but must be likely to cause damage if it escapes. Courts construe this requirement strictly. The dangerous thing itself must escape; the escape of fire generated on the land usually does not suffice unless the thing accumulated and escaped was itself the dangerous thing (Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248).

4. Escape: The substance must escape from the defendant's land (over which they have control) to land outside their control. An incident confined entirely to the defendant's land is not covered (Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156).

5. Foreseeable Damage: The damage caused by the escape must be of a type that was reasonably foreseeable (Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264). This limits recoverable loss and aligns the rule with nuisance and negligence on remoteness.

Key Term: Non-Natural Use
A use of land that is extraordinary, unusual, or involves increased danger, going beyond the ordinary and common use of land in the locality.

Key Term: Escape
Movement of the accumulated substance from a place the defendant controls to a place outside their control.

Worked Example 1.5

A factory stores large drums of industrial solvent on its site, which is located near a river. Due to negligent maintenance by an independent contractor hired by the factory, one drum leaks, and the solvent seeps into the ground, eventually contaminating the river and killing fish downstream belonging to a fish farm.

Can the fish farm owner bring a claim under Rylands v Fletcher against the factory?

Answer:
Yes, potentially.

• Accumulation: The factory brought and accumulated industrial solvent (likely to do mischief) onto its land.
• Non-Natural Use: Storing large quantities of industrial solvent may be non-natural use.
• Escape: The solvent escaped from the factory's land into the river.
• Foreseeable Damage: Damage to aquatic life from escaped solvent is foreseeable.
  Strict liability applies if the elements are met. The contractor’s negligence is irrelevant to Rylands liability (though relevant to negligence). Defences (for example, act of a stranger or statutory authority) would need consideration.

Scope and Limitations

Rylands v Fletcher applies infrequently. Domestic water supplies and ordinary utilities are natural uses. Claims based on fires often fail because the dangerous thing accumulated (such as tyres) did not escape, even if fire spread (Stannard v Gore). The activity must involve a special use with an exceptionally high risk, and the thing must escape beyond the defendant’s control.

Worked Example 1.6

A tyre retailer stores thousands of tyres on site. A fire starts and spreads to a neighbouring warehouse. The neighbour sues under Rylands v Fletcher.

Will the claim succeed?

Answer:
Unlikely. The dangerous thing brought onto the land was tyres; the thing that escaped was fire. The rule requires the dangerous thing itself to escape. Storing tyres generally does not constitute non-natural use with an exceptionally high risk unless other features increase the risk considerably. A negligence or nuisance claim may be more appropriate on these facts.

Defences to Rylands v Fletcher

Defences are similar to those in nuisance, but prescription does not apply:

• Consent: The claimant expressly or impliedly consented to the accumulation or activity.
• Act of God: The escape was caused by exceptional natural forces that could not reasonably have been foreseen or guarded against.
• Act of a Stranger: The escape was caused by an unforeseeable act of a third party over whom the defendant had no control (Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 85).
• Statutory Authority: The accumulation was required or authorised by statute; the escape must have been an inevitable consequence of complying with statutory duties without negligence.
• Contributory Negligence: The claimant’s fault contributed to the damage, reducing recoverable damages.
• Common Benefit: If the accumulation was maintained for the common benefit of both claimant and defendant (for example, shared water storage), liability may be negated.

Remedies under Rylands v Fletcher

The primary remedy is damages for the foreseeable damage caused to property. As with private nuisance, damages for personal injury are not recoverable under this rule (Cambridge Water; Transco). Injunctions may be appropriate in quia timet actions (to prevent a threatened escape) in rare cases, but damages are the usual remedy once an escape has occurred.

Worked Example 1.7

A block of flats has a communal water tank supplying residents. A defect causes water to escape, damaging a neighbour’s property adjacent to the site.

Does Rylands v Fletcher apply?

Answer:
Probably not. Supplying water to flats is an ordinary, natural use. Absent exceptional risk, Transco suggests Rylands will not apply. However, a negligence or nuisance claim may succeed, depending on the facts (for example, failure to maintain, adoption/continuation of a hazardous condition and foreseeability of damage).

Revision Tip

Although Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability, the requirement for non-natural use, the dangerous thing itself escaping, and foreseeable damage significantly limits its scope. Consider whether a claim might be better pursued in negligence or private nuisance, depending on the facts, particularly whether the interference was ongoing or an isolated escape, and the type of damage caused.

Key Point Checklist

This article has covered the following key knowledge points:

• Private nuisance protects against unlawful (substantial and unreasonable) interference with the use or enjoyment of land.
• Amenity interferences (noise, smells, dust) are actionable without physical damage if substantial and unreasonable; physical damage to property will almost always be unreasonable, and locality is irrelevant in such cases.
• Only claimants with a proprietary interest in land (those with exclusive possession) can sue in private nuisance; licensees cannot.
• Liability can fall on the creator, occupier (including for adoption/continuation of nuisances created by trespassers, predecessors or natural causes), or sometimes the landlord (authorisation or failure to repair).
• Unreasonableness depends on factors like locality, duration, frequency, sensitivity, and malice. Reasonable care taken by the defendant does not preclude liability where the interference is unreasonable.
• Foreseeability limits recoverable damage in nuisance; remote or unusual loss is not recoverable.
• Planning permission and environmental permits are not defences; they may inform locality and remedies but do not authorise nuisance.
• Defences include prescription (20 years, private nuisance only), statutory authority, consent, act of God/stranger, and necessity. Coming to the nuisance is not a defence.
• Remedies are damages (for property damage and loss of amenity), injunctions (prohibitory or mandatory, tailored to context) and abatement (self-help).
• The rule in Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability for damage caused by the escape of something dangerous accumulated for a non-natural use of land, subject to foreseeability.
• Key elements are accumulation, non-natural use, escape, and foreseeable damage. The dangerous thing itself must escape.
• Personal injury is not recoverable under Rylands v Fletcher; damages are the usual remedy.
• Defences under Rylands v Fletcher include consent, common benefit, act of God, act of stranger, contributory negligence and statutory authority.

Key Terms and Concepts

• Private Nuisance
• Unlawful Interference
• Reasonable User
• Rylands v Fletcher
• Non-Natural Use
• Escape
• Abatement