## **Learning Outcomes**

This article explores legal causation (remoteness of damage) in negligence and how it limits liability even where duty, breach and factual causation are established. It explains the reasonable foreseeability test from The Wagon Mound (No 1), shows you how to frame the relevant ‘type’ of harm for SQE1 problem questions, and distinguishes carefully between the foreseeability of the general kind of damage and the foreseeability of the precise chain of events or manner of occurrence. It examines the “similar in type” rule using leading authority such as Hughes v Lord Advocate and Tremain v Pike, and details how courts classify harm when deciding whether loss is too remote to be recoverable. It also covers the eggshell skull rule, including its application to physical injury, psychiatric vulnerability, medically triggered consequences and related principles from cases such as Smith v Leech Brain, Robinson v Post Office and Page v Smith. Finally, it provides structured exam guidance on applying remoteness in sequence with duty, breach and factual causation, enabling concise, authority-backed conclusions on whether particular heads of loss are recoverable in SQE1-style scenarios.

## **SQE1 Syllabus**

For SQE1, you are required to understand remoteness of damage in negligence, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

- The reasonable foreseeability test for remoteness established in The Wagon Mound (No 1).
- Distinguishing foreseeability of the general kind/type of harm from foreseeability of the exact manner or chain of events.
- The ‘similar in type’ rule: liability where the kind of damage was foreseeable, even if the precise mechanism was not (e.g. Hughes v Lord Advocate).
- The eggshell skull rule: liability for the full extent of a foreseeable type of injury, including exacerbation due to vulnerability (e.g. Smith v Leech Brain).
- How remoteness interacts with medically triggered consequences (e.g. Robinson v Post Office) and primary-victim psychiatric harm principles (e.g. Page v Smith).
- Practical application: assessing foreseeability at the time of breach by reference to then-available knowledge and risk appreciation.

## **Test Your Knowledge**

_Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision._

1. What is the primary test for determining remoteness of damage in negligence?
   a) Direct consequence test
   b) Reasonable foreseeability test
   c) ‘But for’ test
   d) Material contribution test

2. Which case established the current test for remoteness of damage?
   a) _Donoghue v Stevenson_
   b) _Caparo Industries plc v Dickman_
   c) _The Wagon Mound (No 1)_
   d) _Hughes v Lord Advocate_

3. True or false? For damage not to be too remote, the defendant must have been able to foresee the precise way in which the injury occurred.

4. What is the name of the rule which states that a defendant must take their victim as they find them?

## **Introduction**

Once duty of care, breach and factual causation (‘but for’ or material contribution) are established, a claimant must still show that the loss was not too remote. Remoteness of damage is a control mechanism that fairly limits the consequences of negligence to those harms the law considers sufficiently foreseeable. It ensures defendants are liable for outcomes that were reasonably within their contemplation when breaching their duty, but not for wholly unexpected or unusual damage types. Remoteness is distinct from factual causation and from issues about intervening acts; it focuses on whether, at the time of breach, the kind of harm ultimately suffered was reasonably foreseeable.

> **Key Term: Remoteness of Damage**
> The principle limiting negligence liability to loss that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach; unforeseeable types of damage are too remote and not recoverable.

Remoteness commonly arises in negligence involving physical injury or property damage, but its boundaries are shaped by broader fairness concerns and by the state of knowledge at the time. In assessing foreseeability, courts are not omniscient; they consider what a reasonable person would have foreseen given the information and general knowledge then available.

## **The Test for Remoteness: Reasonable Foreseeability**

In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) (No 1) [1961] AC 388, the Privy Council rejected the earlier ‘direct consequence’ approach in Re Polemis and adopted reasonable foreseeability as the governing test. The question is whether the general kind or type of damage suffered was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the breach. If yes, it is not too remote; if no, it is too remote.

Foreseeability is judged by reference to what a reasonable person would have contemplated at the time of breach in all the circumstances, including prevailing knowledge about the risks. This aligns with the negligence framework more broadly, which judges conduct and risk by reference to contemporary understanding (e.g. Roe v Minister of Health on state of knowledge).

### **Worked Example 1.1**

David negligently crashes his car into Paula’s garden wall, causing minor damage. Unforeseeably, the impact also causes a rare, antique vase inside Paula’s house, located near the wall, to fall and smash. Is the damage to the vase too remote?

> **Answer:** Probably yes. While damage to the wall (property damage) was a foreseeable type of harm from the car crash, the damage to the vase inside the house, caused in this specific way, might be considered a different, unforeseeable _type_ of harm or consequence arising from the impact. The defendant need only foresee the _type_ of damage (e.g., property damage from impact), but the specific damage to the vase might be deemed too indirect or unforeseeable in _kind_.

In applying the Wagon Mound test, courts focus on whether property damage of the kind suffered was reasonably foreseeable—not whether every specific item damaged or the exact chain of events was foreseen. The analysis is sensitive to the facts and to how courts classify the “type” of harm.

## **Type of Harm vs. Manner of Occurrence**

A central distinction in remoteness is between foreseeability of the type of harm and foreseeability of the precise manner by which it occurred. The law requires only that the type of harm be reasonably foreseeable; the specific mechanism or bizarre chain of events need not be.

> **Key Term: Similar in Type Rule**
> Where the general kind of damage was reasonably foreseeable, liability arises even if the exact manner in which the damage occurred was not foreseeable.

The leading case is Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837. Workmen left an open manhole covered by a tent and demarcated by paraffin lamps. Boys entered, knocked a lamp into the hole, and an explosion occurred, causing severe burns. The House of Lords held that while the explosion was not foreseeable, injury by burning was foreseeable. Burns were within the foreseeable “type” of harm; the precise way they happened did not matter.

### **Worked Example 1.2**

Workmen employed by the defendant left an open manhole unattended, covered by a tent and surrounded by paraffin lamps. Two boys entered the tent, took a lamp, and went down the manhole. One boy knocked the lamp into the hole, causing a violent explosion and severe burns. The defendants argued the explosion was unforeseeable. Is the damage too remote?

> **Answer:** No. The House of Lords held that while the explosion itself (the manner of occurrence) was not foreseeable, the _type_ of harm – injury by burning from contact with paraffin lamps – was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, the damage was not too remote.

The “similar in type” rule is not unlimited. If the actual harm is categorically different from any foreseeable kind, recovery is barred. In Tremain v Pike [1969] 3 All ER 1303, negligent rat infestation led to the claimant contracting Weil’s disease via rat urine. The court held that the only foreseeable type of harm was rat bites; disease from urine was too unusual and was not a foreseeable type. Accordingly, the disease was too remote.

### **Worked Example 1.3**

A farm employer negligently permits rats to proliferate. The claimant, working on the farm, contracts Weil’s disease from exposure to rat urine. The employer argues they could only foresee rat bites. Is the disease too remote?

> **Answer:** Yes. The court in Tremain v Pike held the foreseeable type of harm was injury from rat bites. Contracting a rare disease via urine exposure was not a foreseeable kind of harm; it was therefore too remote.

### **Revision Tip**

Identify the damage’s general category (e.g. burns, impact injury, property damage). Ask whether that category was reasonably foreseeable in light of the specific breach. If yes, focus on whether the harm is “similar in type” to what was foreseeable; do not be drawn into the precise sequence of events. If the harm is different in kind, the claim fails for remoteness.

## **The Eggshell Skull Rule**

Remoteness is qualified by the eggshell skull (thin skull) rule. Once the type of injury is foreseeable, the defendant is liable for the full extent of that injury even if the claimant’s vulnerability makes it much worse than expected.

> **Key Term: Eggshell Skull Rule**
> If a foreseeable type of injury occurs, the defendant is liable for its full extent, even if the claimant’s pre-existing susceptibility makes the consequences more severe than could reasonably have been anticipated.

Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405 confirms this approach. A foreseeable burn triggered latent cancer, leading to death. Because burning was a foreseeable type of harm, the employer was liable for the full consequences, including the cancer.

The eggshell rule reaches beyond physical fragility. It applies to medically recognised psychiatric vulnerability and, in principle, to a claimant’s impecuniosity where it exacerbates the financial consequences of a foreseeable harm (e.g. hire costs recoverable at higher rates because the claimant cannot afford cheaper options: see Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067).

A closely related point concerns medically necessary treatment following injury. In Robinson v Post Office [1974] 1 WLR 1176, a minor injury led to an anti-tetanus injection, which caused a severe allergic reaction. The further injury was not too remote: medical treatment was a foreseeable consequence, and the eggshell rule required taking the victim as found.

### **Worked Example 1.4**

An employee suffered a burn on his lip due to his employer's negligence. The employee had a pre-existing pre-cancerous condition in his lip tissue. The burn triggered this condition, causing cancer from which the employee died. Death from cancer was not a foreseeable consequence of the minor burn. Is the employer liable for the death?

> **Answer:** Yes. The court held that injury by burning (the _type_ of harm) was foreseeable. Applying the eggshell skull rule, the employer was liable for the full consequence of that burn, including the resulting cancer and death, even though the _extent_ of the harm was unforeseeable due to the claimant's pre-existing condition.

### **Worked Example 1.5**

After a minor leg injury caused by negligence, a claimant receives an anti-tetanus injection and suffers an unforeseen, severe allergic reaction. Is the allergic reaction too remote?

> **Answer:** No. The need for medical treatment following injury is itself foreseeable. The eggshell skull rule requires the defendant to take the victim as found; the additional harm from a rare allergy does not render the damage too remote.

The eggshell principle operates only after a foreseeable type of injury is established. It is not a substitute for the initial foreseeability requirement: if the kind of injury itself was not foreseeable, the rule does not apply.

### **Exam Warning**

Do not confuse the eggshell skull rule with the initial remoteness test. The eggshell rule applies only once a foreseeable category of injury is established; it concerns the extent of harm, not its kind. If the kind of injury is not reasonably foreseeable, the claim fails for remoteness and the eggshell rule is irrelevant.

## **Further Applications and Boundaries**

Foreseeability is assessed at the time of breach, by reference to the state of knowledge then available. This principle is embedded across negligence, ensuring defendants are judged by what a reasonable person could have appreciated at the time (not with hindsight).

Remoteness also interacts with psychiatric harm principles. For primary victims (those within the range of foreseeable physical injury), the House of Lords recognised that foreseeability of physical injury suffices; psychiatric injury consequential on the incident need not itself be foreseeable (Page v Smith [1996] AC 155). This reflects the eggshell approach to extent once the type of risk (personal injury to a primary victim) is foreseeable.

### **Worked Example 1.6**

A driver negligently causes a collision that places the claimant in immediate danger, though the claimant suffers no physical injury. The incident precipitates a recognised psychiatric illness. Is this too remote?

> **Answer:** No. For a primary victim in the zone of danger, foreseeability of some personal injury is enough. Psychiatric injury consequential on a foreseeable personal injury risk is recoverable, even if its occurrence was not itself foreseeable.

Conversely, where the damage suffered is categorically different from any foreseeable kind, remoteness will bar recovery. Returning to disease via rat urine in Tremain v Pike, the court drew a clear line between foreseeable rat bites (physical trauma) and unforeseeable infection from urine (a different kind of harm).

### **Worked Example 1.7**

A contractor negligently discharges oil into a harbour. Welding work nearby continues after enquiries suggest surface oil on open water is unlikely to ignite. Unexpectedly, debris ignites the oil and fire damages the wharf. Is the fire damage too remote?

> **Answer:** Yes on the original facts of The Wagon Mound (No 1). At the time, a reasonable person would not have foreseen the oil catching fire on open water; fire damage was not a foreseeable type of harm, so it was too remote.

## **Revision T&#8203;ip**

In problem-solving, adopt a sequence:

- Identify the breach and frame the reasonably foreseeable categories of harm at the time of breach (consider the state of knowledge then).
- Classify the harm ultimately suffered. Is it “similar in type” to the foreseeable category? If yes, the precise mechanism does not matter.
- If yes, check eggshell skull: was the extent aggravated by vulnerability or medical treatment? If so, the full extent is recoverable.
- If no (harm different in kind), the claim fails for remoteness.

## **Key Point Checklist**

_This article has covered the following key knowledge points:_

- Remoteness of damage limits liability to loss that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach.
- The governing test is reasonable foreseeability of the general kind/type of harm (The Wagon Mound (No 1)).
- It is not necessary to foresee the exact manner of occurrence; liability arises if the harm suffered is similar in type to the foreseeable harm (Hughes v Lord Advocate).
- If the actual harm is of a categorically different kind from any foreseeable harm, it is too remote (Tremain v Pike).
- The defendant must take their victim as they find them: once the type of injury is foreseeable, the full extent is recoverable, including exacerbation due to vulnerability or medical treatment (Smith v Leech Brain; Robinson v Post Office).
- Foreseeability is judged at the time of breach by reference to the state of knowledge then available; hindsight is excluded.
- For primary victims in psychiatric injury cases, foreseeability of physical injury suffices; psychiatric injury consequential on that risk is not too remote (Page v Smith).

## **Key Terms and Concepts**

- Remoteness of Damage
- Similar in Type Rule
- Eggshell Skull Rule


Remoteness of damage - Type of harm vs. exact manner of occurrence