## Facts

- St. Francis College, a private Catholic college in Pennsylvania, employed Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, a United States citizen born in Iraq, as an associate professor.
- The college and members of its tenure committee denied Al-Khazraji tenure.
- Al-Khazraji alleged that the tenure denial was motivated by prejudice against him because he was Arab and therefore violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects the right to make and enforce contracts free from racial discrimination.
- The college argued that § 1981 reaches racial discrimination but not discrimination based on ancestry or ethnicity, and it maintained that Arabs are classified as “Caucasian,” making “racial” discrimination between Arabs and other Caucasians impossible under § 1981.
- Al-Khazraji filed suit in federal court in Pennsylvania nearly three years after the adverse tenure decision, at a time when Third Circuit precedent generally applied Pennsylvania’s six-year limitations period to § 1981 claims.
- The district court concluded the claim was timely but granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that § 1981 did not reach discrimination based on Arabian ancestry.
- While the case was on appeal, the Third Circuit decided *Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.*, applying Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury limitations period to § 1981 actions.
- The Third Circuit declined to apply *Goodman* retroactively to Al-Khazraji’s suit, held that his allegations stated a claim under § 1981, reversed, and remanded for further proceedings; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether Al-Khazraji’s § 1981 claim was time-barred because the Third Circuit later adopted a shorter, two-year limitations period for § 1981 actions, and whether that change should apply retroactively to bar a suit that was timely under prior circuit precedent.
2. Whether a person of Arabian ancestry—often labeled “Caucasian” under modern racial classifications—may allege “racial” discrimination within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on discrimination tied to ancestry or ethnic characteristics.

## Decision

- The Court held that Al-Khazraji’s claim was not time-barred; the Third Circuit properly refused to apply its later, shorter limitations rule retroactively where the plaintiff filed within the previously settled six-year period.
- The Court held that § 1981 may protect persons of Arabian ancestry from intentional discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, even if modern classifications would place Arabs and the alleged discriminators in the same “race.”
- The Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit and remanded for further proceedings because the record did not resolve whether Al-Khazraji was denied tenure because of ancestry or ethnic characteristics (as opposed to other reasons).

## Legal Principles

- “Race” in § 1981 is informed by the broad mid-19th-century understanding at the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; it is not limited to present-day racial categories.
- A § 1981 plaintiff may state a claim by alleging intentional discrimination because of ancestry or ethnic characteristics, even when plaintiff and defendant would be classified as the same race today.
- § 1981 does not provide relief for discrimination based solely on place or nation of origin, or solely on religion; the actionable theory is intentional discrimination aimed at an identifiable ancestral or ethnic group.
- Under *Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson*, a newly adopted limitations rule that shortens the filing period need not be applied retroactively when it would be manifestly unfair to bar a claim filed in reliance on clearly established circuit precedent.
- In this case, because six years was the clearly established limitations period in the Third Circuit when Al-Khazraji filed suit, it would be inequitable to apply the later two-year rule to defeat his claim.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that § 1981 can protect individuals of Arabian ancestry from intentional discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, and it also held that the Third Circuit correctly refused to apply a later, shorter limitations period retroactively to bar a suit that was timely under the circuit law in effect when it was filed; the case was affirmed and remanded for further proceedings on whether such discrimination occurred.


St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987)