St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. White, 369 So. 2d 1007 (1979)

Facts

  • A motorist was killed in a collision with a train at a railroad-highway grade crossing.
  • The decedent’s survivors brought a wrongful-death negligence action against the railroad.
  • The crossing where the collision occurred did not have railroad-highway crossing warning signs (commonly referred to as crossing signs/crossbucks).
  • During trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence of a railroad-industry standard that called for railroads to place railroad-highway crossing signs at all railroad crossings to warn motorists of train traffic.
  • Over the railroad’s objection, the trial judge admitted the industry-standard evidence.
  • The trial judge instructed the jury that a violation of an industry standard may be considered, along with the other facts and circumstances, as evidence of negligence (and not as conclusive proof of negligence).
  • The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the railroad appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a railroad-industry standard requiring railroad-highway crossing signs at all crossings when no such signs were present at the crossing involved in the death.
  2. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that violation of an industry standard may be considered—together with other facts—as evidence of negligence.

Decision

  • The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs.
  • It held that the trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing the jury to hear evidence of the railroad-industry standard regarding crossing signage.
  • It approved the jury instruction explaining that an industry-standard violation may be considered as evidence of negligence when weighed with the other evidence.
  • Evidence of an industry standard or customary practice may be admitted in a negligence case because it can aid the jury in deciding what reasonable care required under the circumstances.
  • A party’s failure to meet an industry standard is not automatically negligence as a matter of law; it is a fact the jury may weigh with all other evidence in deciding whether the defendant acted reasonably.
  • A jury instruction is proper when it accurately explains the limited role of industry standards: relevant to the negligence inquiry, but not conclusive.

Conclusion

St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. White affirmed a wrongful-death judgment where the trial court admitted evidence of an industry standard requiring railroad-highway crossing signs at all crossings and instructed that noncompliance with that standard could be considered, with other facts, as evidence of negligence.