## Facts

- St. Mary’s Honor Center, a Missouri state-run halfway house, employed Melvin Hicks, a Black employee who served as a correctional officer and later a shift commander.
- Hicks was demoted and later discharged.
- Hicks sued under Title VII, alleging the adverse actions were motivated by intentional race discrimination.
- At trial, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas / Burdine framework.
- The district court found Hicks established a prima facie case; the employer articulated two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons; and those reasons were not credible (pretextual).
- Despite finding pretext, the district court concluded Hicks did not prove that race actually motivated the demotion and discharge, and entered judgment for the employer.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that if the factfinder rejects all of the employer’s stated reasons as pretext, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

## Issues

1. In a Title VII intentional discrimination case using the McDonnell Douglas framework, whether a plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law whenever the factfinder rejects all of the employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reasons as pretextual.
2. Whether disbelief of the employer’s proffered reasons compels a finding of intentional discrimination or merely permits that inference.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in a 5–4 decision (Justice Scalia).
- The Court held that rejection of the employer’s articulated reasons does not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law.
- The Court reaffirmed that the employer’s step-two burden is one of production, not persuasion.
- Once the employer produces a nondiscriminatory explanation, the prima facie presumption drops out, and the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden to prove intentional discrimination.
- A finding that the employer’s reasons are false permits, but does not require, the factfinder to infer discrimination; the factfinder may still conclude the plaintiff has not proved discriminatory intent.

## Legal Principles

- Under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on intentional discrimination at all times.
- The employer’s obligation after a prima facie case is only to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; it need not prove the absence of discriminatory motive.
- When the employer meets its production burden, the prima facie presumption no longer controls the outcome.
- Proof that the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual is evidence of discrimination, but does not compel a finding of discrimination as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

Even when a plaintiff shows the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual, Title VII liability is not automatic; the plaintiff must still persuade the factfinder that intentional discrimination occurred.


St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)