## Facts

- Marianne Stanley served as head coach of the University of Southern California (USC) women’s basketball team under a four-year contract (1989–1993) paying $60,000 annually plus a $6,000 housing allowance.
- As the contract neared expiration, Stanley sought a new agreement and asserted she should be paid at the same level as the men’s head basketball coach, George Raveling, based on equal treatment and her program’s success.
- USC offered Stanley increased compensation (described in the record as escalating salary proposals in the approximate $80,000–$100,000 range over three years, plus the housing allowance), but not parity with the men’s coach.
- Negotiations reached an impasse, Stanley’s contract expired, and she was no longer employed as women’s head coach.
- Stanley sued USC and the athletic director, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law, including Title IX and the Equal Pay Act.
- Stanley sought a preliminary injunction ordering USC to reinstate her as head coach and to pay her a nondiscriminatory salary during the litigation.
- The district court denied the requested preliminary injunction, and Stanley filed an interlocutory appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a mandatory preliminary injunction based on Stanley’s showing (or lack of showing) of likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and the balance of hardships.
2. Whether the district court mischaracterized or misapprehended the nature of the relief sought, including reinstatement and pay-related relief.
3. Whether the district court denied Stanley a full and fair opportunity to present evidence at the preliminary-injunction hearing.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction.
- The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Stanley failed to make the heightened showing required for mandatory preliminary relief.
- The court agreed that, on the preliminary-injunction record, Stanley did not clearly show a likelihood of success on her pay-disparity discrimination theory because the men’s and women’s coaching positions involved materially different responsibilities and qualifications.
- The court concluded Stanley did not clearly show a likelihood of success on retaliation, noting USC’s substantial raise offers were consistent with an intent to retain her rather than punish protected complaints.
- The court upheld the district court’s assessment that Stanley’s asserted harms were largely compensable by damages and that forcing reinstatement and disputed pay would impose significant hardship and disruption on USC.
- The court rejected Stanley’s argument that she was denied a fair opportunity to present evidence at the hearing, finding the district court’s management of the proceeding permissible.

## Legal Principles

- A preliminary injunction requires a showing of likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm absent relief, and that equities and public interest support relief.
- A mandatory preliminary injunction—one that alters rather than preserves the status quo, such as ordering reinstatement and compelled employment—requires a heightened showing; the law and facts must clearly favor the moving party.
- At the preliminary-injunction stage, a plaintiff asserting an Equal Pay Act-based theory must make a strong factual showing that the compared jobs are substantially equal; material differences in responsibilities (including public relations and revenue-related duties) may justify pay differentials.
- Evidence that an employer offered significant increased compensation may undermine, at the preliminary stage, a claim that negotiations or nonrenewal were retaliatory.
- Trial courts have broad discretion to manage the evidentiary presentation at preliminary-injunction hearings; reversal requires a showing that limitations denied a fair opportunity to be heard.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of Stanley’s request for an order reinstating her and requiring interim pay adjustments because she did not meet the heightened standard for mandatory preliminary injunctions, failed to clearly demonstrate likely success or irreparable harm, and was not deprived of a fair opportunity to present evidence.


Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994)