## Facts

- Marianne Stanley served as head coach of the University of Southern California (USC) women’s basketball team from 1989 until her four-year contract expired on June 30, 1993.
- Stanley’s base salary was $60,000 (later $62,000). USC’s men’s basketball coach, George Raveling, earned substantially more and had significantly greater experience, reputation, and market demand.
- In April–June 1993, USC and Stanley negotiated possible renewal terms:
  - Stanley claimed an April 20 discussion produced an agreement to pay her compensation equivalent to Raveling’s; USC denied any such agreement and asserted it said it could not pay that amount and would later make a written offer.
  - USC offered a three-year contract on April 27 with escalating salary and a housing allowance; negotiations continued with counterproposals.
  - USC ultimately withdrew the three-year offer and made a final one-year offer at $96,000, which Stanley did not accept.
- After the contract expired, Stanley sued alleging sex-based pay discrimination and related discrimination/retaliation claims, plus breach of contract and related state-law theories.
- The district court granted summary judgment to USC and the athletic director on the remaining discrimination and contract claims, denied Stanley’s motion to recuse the judge for alleged bias, and taxed costs against Stanley.

## Issues

1. Whether the salary disparity between the women’s and men’s basketball head coaches violated the Equal Pay Act and related discrimination statutes, and whether USC proved the differential was based on a factor other than sex.
2. Whether the evidence supported Title VII/Title IX and analogous state-law claims for sex discrimination and retaliation connected to the negotiations and non-renewal.
3. Whether an enforceable renewal contract arose from the April 20 discussion or later communications, supporting breach of contract and related implied-covenant claims.
4. Whether the district judge’s conduct required recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
5. Whether taxing costs against Stanley was an abuse of discretion, and whether Stanley’s appeals on recusal and costs warranted appellate sanctions.

## Decision

- Affirmed summary judgment for USC and the athletic director on federal and state discrimination claims and on contract-based claims.
- Affirmed denial of Stanley’s motion to recuse the district judge.
- Vacated the costs award and remanded for reconsideration in light of Stanley’s financial condition and deterrent effects on civil-rights plaintiffs.
- Denied defendants’ request for appellate sanctions.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Equal Pay Act, even if jobs are substantially equal, an employer avoids liability by proving the wage differential is based on a statutory defense, including “any other factor other than sex.”
- Experience, reputation, and market demand may qualify as a “factor other than sex” supporting a pay differential, absent evidence that such reasons are a pretext for sex discrimination.
- Under Title VII/Title IX frameworks, once the employer articulates legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of pretext.
- Where an employment contract expires by its own terms and negotiations do not result in an enforceable renewal agreement, the employer’s refusal to renew on the employee’s preferred terms does not establish breach of contract or an implied-covenant violation.
- Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires an objective showing that impartiality might reasonably be questioned; adverse rulings or isolated remarks, without evidence of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, are insufficient.
- In awarding costs against a losing civil-rights plaintiff, a court should consider the plaintiff’s financial resources and whether the costs award could deter enforcement of civil-rights laws.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that USC’s higher pay for the men’s coach was justified by non-sex factors such as superior experience and market value, that no enforceable renewal contract existed after the prior agreement expired, and that recusal was unwarranted; it nonetheless required reconsideration of costs to account for the plaintiff’s finances and deterrent effects on civil-rights litigation.


Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999)