## Facts

- A divorce decree required the father to buy his son a car when the son turned sixteen.
- The father purchased the vehicle, held title, insured it, and provided it to the son in satisfaction of that obligation.
- The son lived with his mother; the father lived in a different residence.
- While driving home from a holiday shopping trip with his sister and her friend, the son collided with Arlene Starr’s vehicle.
- Starr sued the son for negligence and sought to impose vicarious liability on the father under Tennessee’s family purpose doctrine, alleging the father owned, insured, and provided the car.
- The father argued the doctrine did not apply because he did not live in the same household as the son, the car was for the son’s sole use, and the father lacked control over the son’s driving (with day-to-day limits set by the mother).

## Issues

1. Whether a divorced parent who does not reside with the child may qualify as a “head of the household” for purposes of the family purpose doctrine.
2. Whether the vehicle was furnished and maintained for the comfort or pleasure of the family, rather than solely for the child’s individual use.
3. Whether the child was operating the vehicle with the parent’s express or implied permission, reflecting sufficient parental control, such that the doctrine can be applied on summary judgment.

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the father could qualify as a head of household under the family purpose doctrine despite living separately from the son.
- The court held the “family purpose” element was satisfied as a matter of law where the father furnished and maintained the vehicle as part of his support obligation and for the child’s transportation.
- The court held a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the permission/control element, making summary judgment inappropriate.

## Legal Principles

- The family purpose doctrine imposes vicarious liability on a vehicle owner when: (1) the owner is a head of the household; (2) the owner furnishes and maintains the vehicle for the comfort or pleasure of the family; and (3) at the time of the injury, the vehicle is driven in furtherance of that purpose with the owner’s express or implied permission (i.e., with sufficient owner control).
- Common residence between parent and child is not a mandatory condition for “head of household” status; a nonresident parent with a continuing support obligation who provides the vehicle may meet that element.
- Whether the owner retained sufficient control over the vehicle’s use, and whether the driver acted with express or implied permission, is typically fact-dependent and may preclude resolution on summary judgment.

## Conclusion

The court clarified that a divorced, nonresident parent can be treated as a head of household and can satisfy the “family purpose” element when providing and maintaining a vehicle as part of support, but vicarious liability under the family purpose doctrine still turns on a fact-intensive permission/control inquiry requiring trial when the record supports competing inferences.


Starr v. Hill, 353 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. 2011)