## Facts

- Washington’s Constitution reserved initiative and referendum powers to the people and generally delayed a law’s effective date for 90 days after adjournment to permit referendum petitions.
- The Constitution exempted “emergency” measures from referendum and made them immediately effective when necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety, or for the support of state government and existing public institutions.
- The legislature enacted a statute reorganizing the board of state land commissioners and transferring authority over public lands and related offices.
- The statute included an emergency clause designed to make the act immediately effective and not subject to referendum.
- The State, on relation of Brislawn, initiated an original quo warranto proceeding against the State Auditor (Meath) challenging the act’s emergency status as an improper attempt to avoid referendum review.

## Issues

1. Whether courts may review the legislature’s declaration that a statute is an “emergency measure” exempt from referendum and effective immediately under the state constitution.
2. Whether the land-board reorganization statute fit within the constitutionally defined emergency categories.

## Decision

- The court held that a legislative emergency declaration is not conclusive and is subject to judicial review for compliance with the constitutional definition.
- The court nevertheless upheld the statute’s emergency clause, concluding the act reasonably related to the support and functioning of state government and its existing public institutions.
- The writ was denied, and the act was treated as immediately effective and exempt from referendum.

## Legal Principles

- Initiative and referendum provisions reserve legislative power to the people; exceptions that remove measures from referendum are construed narrowly in light of that reservation.
- Courts may examine whether an “emergency” declaration fits the constitutional grounds for emergency legislation; the legislature cannot insulate ordinary laws from referendum merely by labeling them emergencies.
- Legislative determinations receive substantial deference; an emergency clause will be sustained if the statute bears a reasonable relation to constitutionally permitted emergency purposes and is not a plain abuse or clear evasion.

## Conclusion

The court recognized judicial authority to review emergency clauses for constitutional compliance but applied a deferential standard and sustained the legislature’s emergency designation for a statute reorganizing state land administration as sufficiently connected to the support of state government and its institutions, making the act immediately effective and not referable.


State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (Wash. 1915)