## Facts

- A county school official petitioned juvenile court to adjudicate Gilbert Harris (age 16) neglected or delinquent based on irregular attendance, alleging 50 days of truancy.
- At the hearing, Harris appeared with counsel and his mother and did not deny the truancy allegations.
- The juvenile court adjudicated Harris delinquent under a statutory definition that included habitual truancy and committed him to state custody for up to one year.
- Harris was placed in secure institutional settings, ultimately confined at the Davis Center for Boys, a forestry camp/secure facility.
- Harris had no prior juvenile court record; the conduct supporting disposition was truancy, a noncriminal “status” offense.
- Harris filed an original habeas corpus petition in the state high court challenging the legality and constitutionality of his confinement under the juvenile delinquency/disposition statutes.

## Issues

1. Whether committing a first-time juvenile status offender (truancy only) to a secure, prison-like institution violates state constitutional protections, including due process and the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Whether the juvenile delinquency and disposition statutes are facially unconstitutional or instead require limiting constructions to prevent unconstitutional applications to status offenders.
3. Whether the state must attempt and show the inadequacy of less restrictive alternatives before imposing secure confinement on a status offender.

## Decision

- The court granted habeas corpus and ordered Harris immediately discharged from confinement.
- The court declined to hold the delinquency-definition and disposition statutes facially unconstitutional, but imposed constitutional limits to prevent unconstitutional application.
- The court held Harris’s secure confinement unconstitutional because the state had not shown that reasonable, less restrictive alternatives were tried or were inadequate for a status offender.
- The court directed dissemination of its ruling to juvenile-placement officials so similarly confined juveniles could seek relief in circuit courts.

## Legal Principles

- Juvenile status offenders (conduct not criminal if committed by an adult, such as truancy) must be treated differently from juveniles adjudicated for criminal-type delinquent acts.
- Secure confinement of a status offender is constitutionally restricted; before such confinement, the state must show that reasonable, less restrictive alternatives have been exhausted or are inadequate.
- Institutional confinement for noncriminal status behavior may be disproportionate and violate the state prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment when it resembles incarceration alongside criminally adjudicated youths.
- Juvenile statutes may be upheld on their face but must be construed and applied within state constitutional limits, including due process and equal protection constraints; fiscal convenience does not justify unconstitutional confinement.

## Conclusion

The court held that while West Virginia’s juvenile delinquency and disposition statutes could remain in force, a first-time truancy status offender could not be placed in secure confinement absent a demonstrated failure or inadequacy of less restrictive alternatives, and it ordered Harris’s immediate release.


State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 160 W. Va. 172, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977)