State ex rel. Haskell v. Spokane County District Court, 465 P.3d 343, 13 Wash. App. 2d 573 (2020)

Facts

  • Reverend George Taylor was an environmental activist in Spokane, Washington, involved in efforts to stop or limit railroad transportation of coal and oil.
  • Taylor believed transporting coal and oil by rail created serious risks, including derailments, spills, explosions, and broader climate-related harms.
  • After trying lawful methods to influence policy—such as seeking action from local legislators—without achieving the change he wanted, Taylor joined other protestors in an action aimed at stopping a train.
  • Taylor and the group stood on railroad tracks owned by BNSF Railway Company to block an incoming train carrying coal and oil.
  • BNSF posted signs warning that entering the property and interfering with railroad operations was unlawful; Taylor knew he lacked permission to be on the tracks.
  • Taylor was arrested and charged in Spokane County District Court with second degree criminal trespass and unlawful obstruction of a train (misdemeanors).
  • Taylor moved in district court to present the common-law necessity defense at trial, claiming he acted to prevent greater harms tied to oil/coal transport and climate change and that his prior lawful efforts had failed.
  • In support, Taylor presented testimony, including from three expert witnesses addressing climate-related risks, the claimed effectiveness of nonviolent civil disobedience, and environmental and safety risks of oil/coal rail transport.
  • The district court granted Taylor’s motion and allowed him to present a necessity defense at trial.
  • Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney Lawrence Haskell, on behalf of the State, sought review in superior court by petitioning for a writ of review (certiorari), arguing the district court erred as a matter of law in allowing the necessity defense.
  • The superior court reversed the district court and barred Taylor from presenting the necessity defense.
  • Appellate review was sought in Division Three of the Washington Court of Appeals, challenging the superior court’s writ decision and the legal basis for precluding necessity.

Issues

  1. In a prosecution arising from intentional civil-disobedience conduct (trespass and blocking a train), may a defendant present a necessity defense when lawful avenues of political participation and protest remain available?
  2. Did the district court err in ruling that Taylor had presented enough evidence to submit the necessity defense to the jury, particularly on the element requiring no reasonable legal alternatives?
  3. Did the superior court properly grant writ relief and reverse the district court’s pretrial order permitting the necessity defense?

Decision

  • The Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, affirmed the superior court’s writ decision.
  • The court held that Taylor could not present a necessity defense because, as a matter of law, he had reasonable legal alternatives to committing second degree criminal trespass and unlawfully obstructing a train.
  • The court treated the continued availability of lawful methods—such as petitioning government, voting, public advocacy, and lawful protest—as sufficient to defeat the “no reasonable legal alternatives” element for necessity in this civil-disobedience setting.
  • Because the necessity defense failed on the “reasonable legal alternatives” requirement, the district court erred in allowing Taylor to present necessity at trial.
  • The effect of the decision was to bar Taylor from presenting the necessity defense in the underlying criminal case.
  • Washington’s common-law necessity defense is narrow and requires proof, among other elements, that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law.
  • When a defendant intentionally violates a constitutional criminal law as a form of civil disobedience, the availability of lawful political and legal avenues (e.g., advocacy, petitioning, electoral participation, lawful protest) constitutes reasonable alternatives as a matter of law.
  • A trial court may not submit a necessity defense to the jury if the defendant’s proffer cannot satisfy the “no reasonable legal alternatives” element under the governing legal standard.
  • Writ review may be used by a superior court to correct a district court’s pretrial legal error that is not adequately addressed through ordinary appeal routes at that stage of the case.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s writ ruling that barred Reverend Taylor’s necessity defense to charges arising from blocking a BNSF train and trespassing on railroad tracks during a climate protest, concluding that lawful political and legal options remained reasonable alternatives to breaking the law and therefore necessity was unavailable as a matter of law.