## Facts

- A Maricopa County grand jury indicted Edwin C. Cohen for conspiracy to defraud the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) and for multiple substantive theft- and fraud-related counts allegedly committed by co-conspirators.
- The prosecution conceded it presented no evidence that Cohen directly participated in the substantive offenses charged in counts 18–29.
- The grand jury was instructed that Cohen could be liable for substantive crimes committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy even if he did not personally commit those crimes (Pinkerton-style liability).
- Cohen moved to dismiss or remand the substantive counts, arguing Arizona law required proof of accomplice (or principal) liability rather than vicarious liability based solely on conspiracy membership.
- The superior court remanded counts 18–29 to the grand jury for a new probable-cause determination.
- The court of appeals reversed and ordered further proceedings based on the existing indictment.
- The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to address conspirator liability for substantive offenses and the scope of the anti-marital fact privilege under A.R.S. § 13-4062(1).

## Issues

1. Whether Arizona law permits Pinkerton-style liability that makes a conspirator criminally liable for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators solely by virtue of the conspiracy, absent accomplice or principal liability.
2. Whether the anti-marital fact privilege in A.R.S. § 13-4062(1) is limited to testimony adverse to a criminal defendant-spouse.

## Decision

- The Arizona Supreme Court held Arizona does not recognize Pinkerton-style vicarious co-conspirator liability for substantive offenses.
- The Court held a conspirator may be liable for substantive offenses committed by others only if the statutory requirements for accomplice liability (or other direct liability) are met.
- Because the State presented no evidence that Cohen aided or attempted to aid the substantive offenses in counts 18–29, the trial court properly required a new grand-jury probable-cause determination for those counts.
- The Court held the anti-marital fact privilege in A.R.S. § 13-4062(1) is not limited to testimony adverse to a criminal defendant; it applies according to the statute’s terms.
- The Court rejected the court of appeals’ approach that would allow the indictment to stand on a Pinkerton-based theory.

## Legal Principles

- Conspiracy is a distinct offense; liability for separate substantive crimes requires independent statutory grounds beyond mere conspiracy membership.
- Arizona accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant, with intent to promote or facilitate the offense, aided, counseled, agreed to aid, or attempted to aid another in planning or committing the crime.
- Pinkerton-style vicarious liability for foreseeable substantive offenses committed in furtherance of a conspiracy is not part of Arizona law absent legislative authorization.
- Under A.R.S. § 13-4062(1), the anti-marital fact privilege is not confined to testimony adverse to a criminal defendant-spouse; courts apply the privilege as written, without adding an “adverse testimony” limitation.

## Conclusion

Arizona limited criminal responsibility for substantive offenses to direct or statutorily defined derivative liability (such as accomplice liability) and refused to extend liability based solely on conspiracy status, while also construing the anti-marital fact privilege broadly according to its statutory text rather than restricting it to adverse testimony against a defendant-spouse.


State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 844 P.2d 1147 (Ariz. 1992)