## Facts

- Ramsey Agan, a property owner seeking to build a hotel, repeatedly sought a DeKalb County building-height variance that the county commission had twice denied.
- During his third attempt, Agan met with commissioners Lanier and Fletcher and asked what he could do to secure approval.
- Agan urged Fletcher to support the variance and left Fletcher multiple checks totaling $3,700, made payable to Fletcher personally and marked “for campaign contribution,” despite Fletcher’s statement that he did not have a campaign account.
- The checks were drawn on accounts of Sarper and other individuals who testified they were reimbursed by Agan, supporting an inference that Agan used straw donors to make the payments appear broadly supported.
- Agan later delivered an additional $800 check to Fletcher, also marked as a campaign contribution from another individual.
- Agan and Sarper met with Lanier about the variance; afterward, Agan returned alone and delivered an envelope containing Sarper’s $3,000 check to Lanier marked “campaign contribution,” even though Lanier was not up for re-election for several years.
- The State charged that the payments, though labeled as campaign contributions, were offered to influence the commissioners’ votes on the variance.

## Issues

1. Whether the bribery statute, OCGA § 16-10-2(a)(1), permits prosecution when the thing of value is labeled as a campaign contribution under Georgia’s campaign-finance and ethics laws.
2. Whether a payment denominated (and potentially reportable) as a campaign contribution may still constitute a bribe when made with corrupt intent to influence a specific official act.
3. Whether the intermediate appellate court erred by treating properly reportable campaign contributions as benefits to which an official is “entitled,” thereby insulating them from bribery liability.

## Decision

- The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the intermediate court’s construction that broadly exempted campaign contributions from the bribery statute.
- The court held that a transfer labeled as a campaign contribution may constitute bribery if given with corrupt intent to influence official action.
- The court concluded that campaign-finance reporting requirements do not create immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-10-2(a)(1) merely because a payment is styled as, or reported as, a campaign contribution.

## Legal Principles

- Under OCGA § 16-10-2(a)(1), bribery focuses on a benefit offered with intent to influence a public officer’s performance of an official act.
- A payment’s label (including “campaign contribution”) and its reportability under campaign-finance statutes do not determine criminality; the controlling inquiry is corrupt intent and the purpose of influencing official action.
- Campaign-finance and ethics statutes regulate disclosure and related compliance; they do not narrow the scope of the bribery statute or create a safe harbor for payments offered in exchange for official acts.

## Conclusion

The court held that Georgia’s bribery statute reaches payments made “under the guise” of campaign contributions when the State can prove corrupt intent to influence an identified official act, so campaign-finance regulation does not shield quid pro quo payments from bribery prosecution.


State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1989)