## Facts

- An adult woman (identified as “Anonymous”) confronted another woman by following her car and then shouting insults from a nearby vehicle after the complainant parked and exited her car.
- The defendant allegedly used personally abusive epithets (including “tramp”), made a sexually derogatory accusation involving the complainant’s mother, and told the complainant she was “going to get” her.
- Later that night, the defendant allegedly called the complainant at her workplace and repeated substantially similar insults and threatening language.
- The State charged the defendant with disorderly conduct under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(a)(2) (offensive conduct intentionally or recklessly interfering with another, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm) and harassment by telephone under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183(a)(3) (telephone call made in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm).
- The trial court instructed the jury on the statutory mental states and defined key terms (including “harass,” “annoy,” and “alarm”) but did not expressly require a finding of “fighting words.”
- The jury convicted on both counts, and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict.

## Issues

1. Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-182(a)(2) and 53a-183(a)(3) were unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment as applied to the defendant’s insults and threats.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that it could convict only if the defendant’s words constituted “fighting words” within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction on both counts.
- The court held that, in context, the defendant’s statements could reasonably be found to constitute “fighting words” and thus fell outside First Amendment protection.
- The court rejected the overbreadth challenge as applied, relying on the statutes’ intent elements and the character of the defendant’s targeted, abusive, and threatening conduct.
- The court held the jury instructions were adequate when read as a whole, even without using Chaplinsky’s “fighting words” phrasing, because they sufficiently limited the jury to conduct the legislature could criminalize.

## Legal Principles

- “Fighting words”—personally abusive epithets and similar direct verbal attacks likely to provoke an average person to immediate retaliation—are not protected by the First Amendment and may be punished consistently with free-speech guarantees.
- A statute regulating speech may survive an overbreadth attack as applied when the prosecution is limited to unprotected expression (such as fighting words or threats) and when the statute’s elements, including specific intent requirements, constrain its reach.
- On appellate review of claimed instructional error, the charge is assessed in its entirety; reversal is not required where the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately prevent conviction for constitutionally protected speech even if they do not recite a preferred constitutional label or formula.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed convictions for disorderly conduct and telephone harassment because the defendant’s direct insults and threat, directed at an individual in circumstances likely to provoke a breach of the peace, could be treated as unprotected fighting words; the statutes were constitutional as applied and the jury charge sufficiently guarded against punishment of protected speech.


State v. Anonymous, 389 A.2d 1270 (Conn. App. Div. Super. Ct. 1978)