## Facts

- April Nicole Armstard, age 26, gave birth on February 25, 2007, to V.M., an extremely premature infant (23 weeks, 5 days).
- Armstard tested positive for cocaine and amphetamines at the hospital and admitted using cocaine and other drugs during pregnancy.
- V.M. tested positive for cocaine and barbiturates, was placed on life support, transferred to another hospital, and died on April 25, 2007.
- After V.M.’s death, Armstard was arrested for second-degree murder; a grand jury instead indicted her for cruelty to juveniles under La. R.S. 14:93.
- The State’s theory was not that prenatal ingestion itself constituted cruelty, but that after V.M. took a breath (and thus became a “child”), drugs already in Armstard’s bloodstream continued to pass to V.M. through the umbilical cord until severed, which the State characterized as “distribution” causing unjustifiable pain and suffering.
- Armstard moved to quash the indictment, arguing the statute required mistreatment of a “child” at the time of the act and that the alleged injurious conduct occurred in utero.
- The trial court denied the motion to quash; Armstard sought supervisory review.

## Issues

1. Whether an indictment for cruelty to juveniles under La. R.S. 14:93 states an offense when the State’s only post-birth theory is passive transmission of previously ingested drugs through an umbilical cord after the newborn takes a breath.
2. Whether La. R.S. 14:93 requires a voluntary act or criminally negligent omission directed at a “child” at the time of the mistreatment or neglect.
3. Whether strict construction of a criminal statute and the rule of lenity bar extending La. R.S. 14:93 to reach prenatal drug use through a post-birth “distribution” theory.

## Decision

- The appellate court granted supervisory relief and reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash.
- The court held the alleged post-birth drug transfer through the umbilical cord was a passive physiological process, not a voluntary act or criminally negligent omission constituting mistreatment or neglect of a “child” under La. R.S. 14:93.
- Applying strict construction and the rule of lenity, the court declined to extend La. R.S. 14:93 to cover prenatal drug ingestion by characterizing it as post-birth “distribution.”
- The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the cruelty-to-juveniles indictment.

## Legal Principles

- Cruelty to juveniles under La. R.S. 14:93 requires intentional mistreatment or criminally negligent mistreatment/neglect of a “child” that causes unjustifiable pain and suffering.
- Criminal liability generally requires a voluntary act or a criminally negligent omission; passive bodily processes, without a qualifying act or omission at the relevant time, do not satisfy this requirement.
- Criminal statutes are strictly construed; courts may not create criminal liability by analogy or interpretive expansion beyond the statute’s clear reach.
- Under the rule of lenity, ambiguity in a criminal statute concerning whether it covers the charged conduct must be resolved in favor of the accused, particularly where the prosecution theory would extend the statute to new conduct.
- Legislative consideration and nonenactment of proposals addressing prenatal drug exposure may confirm that existing statutory text does not reach such conduct absent clear legislative authorization.

## Conclusion

The court ordered dismissal of the cruelty-to-juveniles indictment because the State’s post-birth umbilical-cord theory alleged only passive drug transfer from prior prenatal ingestion, which did not constitute a voluntary act or criminal negligence toward a “child” within La. R.S. 14:93, and any statutory ambiguity had to be resolved in the defendant’s favor.


State v. Armstard, 991 So. 2d 116 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2008)