## Facts

- Anthony Tyrone Armstrong and Mychal Alexander fought near a Seattle playground.
- During the altercation, Armstrong shot Alexander; witnesses testified Alexander was on the ground when shot.
- Alexander died from gunshot wounds.
- Armstrong asserted self-defense, claiming he believed Alexander was armed and would shoot first.
- The State charged second-degree murder under alternative means: (1) intentional murder and (2) felony murder predicated on second-degree assault with a deadly weapon.
- The jury acquitted Armstrong of intentional second-degree murder and convicted him of second-degree felony murder based on second-degree assault.

## Issues

1. Whether Washington’s second-degree felony-murder statute, RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b), violates federal and state equal protection when second-degree assault serves as the predicate felony.
2. Whether the statute permits arbitrary prosecutorial charging by allowing felony-murder charging without proof of intent to kill.
3. Whether the felony-murder framework improperly affects access to lesser-included offense instructions (such as manslaughter), creating unconstitutional unequal treatment.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed Armstrong’s conviction and sentence.
- The court applied rational basis review, holding the statute does not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right for equal protection purposes.
- The court held RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b) is rationally related to legitimate state interests in deterring dangerous felonies and punishing deaths occurring during those felonies.
- The court rejected the claim that the statute grants unconstitutional charging discretion because intentional murder and felony murder require proof of different elements.
- The court rejected the claim that differences in lesser-included instructions amount to an equal protection violation, treating it as a consequence of the elements chosen by the legislature.

## Legal Principles

- Statutes challenged on equal protection grounds are reviewed de novo for constitutionality.
- Where no suspect or semi-suspect class and no fundamental right is implicated, rational basis review applies; the law is valid if rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
- Prosecutors may choose among charges supported by probable cause; charging discretion does not violate equal protection absent an impermissible classification or arbitrary enforcement inconsistent with the statutory elements.
- Felony murder and intentional murder are distinct offenses with different elements; the legislature may impose different mental-state structures and consequences for killings occurring in the course of specified felonies.
- The availability of lesser-included offense instructions turns on the elements of the charged offense and the evidence, not on equal protection entitlement to a particular instruction set.

## Conclusion

The court held that Washington’s amended second-degree felony-murder statute, including its use of second-degree assault as a predicate felony, survives equal protection review because it reflects a rational legislative choice to deter and punish killings that occur during dangerous felonies, and it does not create an unconstitutional classification through prosecutorial charging options or lesser-included offense consequences.


State v. Armstrong, 178 P.3d 1048 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)