## Facts

- Elery Beale operated an antique shop in Hallowell, Maine.
- In summer 1971, while Beale was away and his wife ran the shop, a customer (Mrs. Johnson) identified certain displayed silverware and glass as items stolen from her home months earlier.
- Mrs. Johnson returned with a police officer, who told Mrs. Beale the items were possibly stolen and instructed that they be removed from display and not sold; Mrs. Beale set the items aside.
- The officer instructed Mrs. Beale to have Beale contact him when he returned; no contact occurred over the weekend.
- On the following Monday, a deputy sheriff investigating the theft went to the shop; Beale stated he had put the items back out for sale on Sunday and sold many of them despite the officer’s request that they be withdrawn.
- Beale indicated that among the items sold were those bearing distinctive initials used by the owner to identify them.
- Beale testified he purchased the items in good faith from people he considered reliable, had receipts for many items, and believed he could sell them notwithstanding the officer’s warning.
- Beale was charged under 17 M.R.S.A. § 3551 with knowingly concealing stolen property.

## Issues

1. Whether “knowing it to be stolen” in 17 M.R.S.A. § 3551 requires proof that the defendant actually knew or believed the property was stolen (subjective knowledge), rather than that a reasonable person would have known (objective standard).
2. Whether jury instructions permitting conviction under an objective “reasonable person” standard misstated the statute and required reversal.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine sustained Beale’s appeal, set aside the conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that the statutory phrase “knowing it to be stolen” requires proof of the defendant’s subjective knowledge or belief that the goods were stolen.
- The court ruled that an objective “reasonable person would have known” formulation is not sufficient for conviction under the statute.
- The trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous because they allowed conviction without requiring the jury to find Beale personally knew or believed the goods were stolen.

## Legal Principles

- When a criminal statute requires that a defendant act “knowing” a fact, the required mens rea is the defendant’s actual knowledge or belief unless the statute clearly provides otherwise.
- “Knowing it to be stolen” in Maine’s stolen-property statute requires a subjective inquiry into what the defendant actually knew or believed, not what a reasonable person should have known.
- Subjective knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence; the State need not produce direct admissions, and the jury may infer knowledge from surrounding circumstances and the defendant’s conduct.
- Jury instructions that permit conviction based on an objective negligence-like standard for a knowledge element constitute reversible error where the jury could have convicted without finding the required subjective mens rea.

## Conclusion

The court interpreted “knowing it to be stolen” to require proof that the defendant personally knew or believed the property was stolen, and it ordered a new trial because the jury was instructed on an improper objective reasonable-person standard.


State v. Beale, 299 A.2d 921 (Me. 1973)