## Facts

- James Brand attended a public rally in Cincinnati, Ohio, at Fountain Square where First Lady Rosalynn Carter was scheduled to speak.
- During Carter’s address, Brand repeatedly shouted statements supporting the Iranian revolution and condemning the Carter administration’s policies toward Iran.
- A police officer asked Brand multiple times to be quiet; Brand refused and continued yelling.
- Police forcibly escorted Brand from the rally area; testimony indicated he kept yelling while being removed and placed in a police vehicle.
- Evidence at trial indicated Carter stopped speaking for approximately 45 seconds during Brand’s outburst.
- Brand was charged under Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1), which prohibits a person, with purpose to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting or assembly, from actually substantially interfering with or obstructing its due conduct.
- Over objection, the trial court instructed the jury that “substantial” means “a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant one that a certain result may occur,” borrowing language from another Ohio statute defining “substantial risk.”
- The jury found Brand guilty, and he was sentenced to jail time; the sentence was stayed pending appeal.
- On appeal, Brand argued (1) the statute was unconstitutional (vague, overbroad, and unconstitutional as applied), and (2) the “substantial” jury instruction was erroneous.

## Issues

1. Whether Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1) is unconstitutional for vagueness or overbreadth, facially or as applied to Brand’s expressive conduct at the rally.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by defining “substantial” using a “substantial risk” instruction rather than the meaning required for § 2917.12(A)(1).

## Decision

- The appellate court held Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague because it gives fair notice of what conduct is forbidden and provides workable standards for enforcement.
- The court held the statute is not facially overbroad when limited, consistent with State v. Schwing, to purposeful interferences that either (a) cause a lawful assemblage to end early or (b) substantially impair the conduct of the assemblage.
- The court defined “substantial,” as used for § 2917.12(A)(1), to mean major, consequential, effective, or significant—interference of considerable quantity or dimension, or of solid effect.
- The court held the trial court’s instruction was wrong because it framed “substantial” as a probability-of-result concept suited to “risk” statutes, not as a magnitude-of-interference requirement for a meeting-disruption offense.
- Because the incorrect instruction could allow conviction for less-than-significant interference, the error was prejudicial.
- The court reversed Brand’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

## Legal Principles

- A criminal statute is not void for vagueness if persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what it prohibits and it supplies enforceable standards that limit arbitrary application.
- A statute aimed at preventing disruption of lawful meetings can survive a facial overbreadth challenge when construed narrowly to reach only purposeful conduct that (1) ends the meeting early or (2) significantly impairs or obstructs its due conduct.
- For Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1), “substantial” means major, consequential, effective, or significant interference—of considerable quantity or dimension, or of solid effect.
- Jury instructions must state the correct legal threshold for “substantial” interference; importing a “substantial risk” definition can reduce the required level of actual disruption and expand the statute’s reach beyond its limiting construction.
- When an erroneous instruction lowers the state’s burden on an essential element (the degree of interference), reversal is required if the jury may have convicted under the wrong standard.

## Conclusion

State v. Brand upheld Ohio’s disturbing-a-lawful-meeting statute against vagueness and overbreadth challenges by applying a narrowing construction requiring significant interference, but it reversed and remanded for a new trial because the jury was improperly instructed on “substantial,” using a probability-based definition that did not match the statute’s required level of actual disruption.


State v. Brand, 442 N.E.2d 805 (1981)