State v. Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 121 A.3d 290 (N.J. 2015)

Facts

  • James Buckner was prosecuted for a parking-lot attack and tried on charges including second-degree robbery and third-degree aggravated assault.

  • The trial judge was a retired Superior Court judge recalled to temporary service under N.J.S.A. 43:6A-13.

  • Before trial, Buckner moved to disqualify the recalled judge, arguing:

    • the state constitution’s mandatory retirement provision barred post-70 judicial service;
    • the recall statute was unconstitutional; and
    • per diem compensation for recall service created a disqualifying financial interest.
  • The trial court denied the motion and the recalled judge presided over the jury trial.

  • The jury convicted Buckner of second-degree robbery and third-degree aggravated assault.

  • The Appellate Division affirmed; a dissent triggered further review.

Issues

  1. Whether N.J.S.A. 43:6A-13, authorizing temporary recall of retired judges, violates the New Jersey Constitution’s mandatory retirement provision for judges.
  2. Whether a recalled judge’s per diem compensation constitutes a disqualifying financial interest requiring recusal.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division and upheld Buckner’s conviction and sentence.
  • The Court held the recall statute constitutional because the constitution’s retirement language did not expressly or by clear implication bar temporary recall.
  • The Court held per diem recall compensation, as a uniform and statutorily authorized payment not tied to case outcomes, did not require disqualification.
  • A legislative enactment is presumed constitutional and will not be invalidated unless its conflict with the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • A constitutional requirement that judges retire at a specified age does not, without express text or clear implication, prohibit a statutory system for temporary recall of retired judges.
  • Temporary recall assignments do not constitute a new constitutional appointment or an unconstitutional reappointment that infringes the executive appointment power.
  • A judge’s receipt of standard, fixed compensation authorized for temporary service, without case-specific or outcome-dependent features, is not a disqualifying financial interest requiring recusal.

Conclusion

The court sustained the statutory mechanism for recalling retired judges to temporary service despite the constitution’s age-based retirement mandate and rejected recusal based solely on uniform per diem recall compensation, leaving the defendant’s convictions undisturbed.