## Facts

- The complainant and the defendant were previously acquainted and had engaged in sexual relations before the charged incident.
- On February 20, 1983, the complainant met the defendant at a bar and voluntarily went with him to his house.
- The complainant testified that, after they went to bed, the defendant became violent, sexually assaulted her multiple times, restrained her, and physically assaulted her.
- The defendant asserted the sexual activity was consensual and claimed the complainant became emotionally unstable when she discussed her husband’s death in Vietnam.
- The defense sought to introduce evidence that, during a prior sexual encounter with another man, the complainant referenced her husband’s death and behaved similarly, to support a theory about her emotional state and to challenge credibility and consent.
- The trial court excluded the proposed third-party sexual-conduct evidence under the state rape shield statute.
- The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first-degree sexual assault, first-degree unlawful restraint, and third-degree assault, and acquitted on one sexual-assault count.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred under the rape shield statute by excluding evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct with a third party offered to support the defense theory about her emotional state and credibility.
2. Whether excluding that evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense.
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on alleged evidentiary insufficiency.
4. Whether the trial court improperly allowed the state to amend the charging information in a way that prejudiced the defense.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the convictions.
- The court held the trial court properly excluded the complainant’s prior sexual-conduct evidence with a third party under the rape shield statute.
- The court held the exclusion did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights or right to present a defense because the evidence had limited probative value and significant risks of prejudice and collateral litigation.
- The court held the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient, and the trial court properly denied the motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial.
- The court held the amendment of the information was not reversible error because it did not alter the nature of the offenses and the defendant failed to show actual prejudice.

## Legal Principles

- Rape shield statutes generally bar evidence of a sexual-assault complainant’s prior sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant unless the evidence is sufficiently relevant and its probative value outweighs countervailing risks.
- A defendant’s rights to confrontation and to present a defense permit meaningful cross-examination, but they are subject to reasonable limits based on relevance, prejudice, harassment of the complainant, and diversion into collateral matters.
- Exclusion of third-party sexual-history evidence does not violate constitutional rights where the evidence has weak connection to consent, bias, motive to fabricate, or truthfulness, and the defense retains other avenues to impeach and argue its theory.
- On sufficiency review, an appellate court sustains the verdict if the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the state, could support the elements of the offenses; credibility disputes are for the jury.
- Amendment of an information is permitted absent a change in the nature of the offense or a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant’s preparation or strategy.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the defendant’s sexual-assault-related convictions, concluding that the rape shield statute properly excluded third-party sexual-conduct evidence offered to suggest an emotional “pattern,” that the exclusion did not infringe confrontation or defense rights, that the trial evidence was sufficient, and that allowing an amended charging information caused no reversible prejudice.


State v. Cassidy, 489 A.2d 386 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985)