## Facts

- Police found Jessie Valero dead in her Hillsboro, Oregon apartment on March 17, 2005, with approximately 29 stab wounds; the scene suggested robbery, and a red bicycle not owned by Valero was found inside.
- The State’s case relied heavily on cooperating witness José Lugardo-Madero, who testified defendants sought methamphetamine, planned to steal Valero’s jewelry, and went to her apartment; he waited outside, heard sounds, left, and later was told by one defendant that the defendants had killed Valero and threatened him if he reported it.
- Four witnesses were prepared to testify that Tiffany Scherer separately confessed that she stabbed a woman to death during an argument; in one confession she identified the victim as Valero.
- Scherer’s reported confessions included details consistent with the crime and victim (high number of stab wounds, robbery-related circumstances, and a seizure consistent with Valero’s epilepsy), and most occurred shortly after the homicide.
- By trial, Scherer was available and denied making the confessions; nevertheless, defendants sought to introduce the four witnesses’ testimony about her statements.
- In Cazares-Mendez’s trial, the court excluded the hearsay on the ground Scherer was not “unavailable,” so the statement-against-penal-interest exception did not apply.
- In Reyes-Sanchez’s trial, the court excluded the hearsay under a “near-miss” rationale, concluding the residual exception could not be used when the evidence narrowly failed another hearsay exception.
- Both defendants were convicted of aggravated murder and related crimes and sentenced to life without parole; the Court of Appeals reversed due to erroneous exclusion of the confession evidence, and the State sought review.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial courts erred under the Oregon Evidence Code by excluding testimony that a third party confessed to committing the homicide.
2. Whether OEC 803(24)’s residual hearsay exception permits admission of evidence that does not satisfy another specific hearsay exception, or whether a “near-miss doctrine” bars admission.
3. Whether the erroneous exclusion, if any, was harmless in light of the remaining evidence.

## Decision

- The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held the trial courts erred by excluding the third-party confession evidence.
- The court held the confessions were admissible under OEC 803(24) because they had equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, were highly probative on identity, and there was no similarly probative alternative evidence reasonably available to the defense.
- The court rejected the “near-miss doctrine” as inconsistent with the text and structure of OEC 803(24).
- The court held the exclusion was not harmless because the evidence went to the core question of who committed the homicide.
- The convictions were reversed and the cases were remanded for new trials.

## Legal Principles

- Under OEC 803(24), hearsay not covered by a specific exception may be admitted if it has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is offered on a material fact, is more probative than other reasonably obtainable evidence, and satisfies the rule’s procedural requirements.
- A hearsay statement may qualify under OEC 803(24) even if it resembles, but does not meet, the technical requirements of another hearsay exception; courts must apply the residual-exception criteria rather than excluding evidence based on a “near miss.”
- Multiple spontaneous confessions to different listeners, containing specific details corroborated by independent evidence and made near in time to the crime, can supply the trustworthiness required for admission under the residual exception.
- Excluding reliable, highly probative third-party confession evidence on the central issue of identity can constitute reversible evidentiary error when it may have affected the jury’s assessment of reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The Oregon Supreme Court held that corroborated third-party confessions should have been admitted under the residual hearsay exception and that Oregon law does not bar such evidence merely because it falls short of another exception; because the exclusion was not harmless, the court ordered new trials.


State v. Cazares-Mendez, 350 Or. 491, 256 P.3d 104 (Or. 2011)