## Facts

- Cohen owned a Hudson seal fur coat and had it delivered to a furrier, Mellon, for alteration and repair for an agreed price.
- Cohen’s husband misrepresented to Mellon that the coat belonged to a third person, not to Cohen.
- After completing the work, Mellon retained the coat, asserting a statutory artisan’s possessory lien and a right to keep possession until paid.
- Cohen repeatedly sought to obtain or keep the coat without paying, including multiple inspection/try-on occasions.
- On January 2, 1935, Mellon brought the coat to Cohen’s home; Cohen tried it on, said she needed to view it in another room, and then disappeared with the coat without paying or returning it.
- Cohen later made evasive statements about the coat’s whereabouts; the coat was eventually located at a downtown store, supporting an inference that she concealed or disposed of it.
- The state charged Cohen with grand larceny in the second degree based on taking the coat from Mellon’s lawful lien possession by trick, intending to defeat his lien and right to possession.

## Issues

1. Whether a general owner can be convicted of larceny for taking her own chattel from a lienholder who has lawful possession, when the taking is done with felonious intent to defeat the lien and possessory rights.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for grand larceny in the second degree and was not contrary to law despite Cohen’s ownership.
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct on petit larceny as a lesser-included offense.
4. Whether the furrier’s statutory lien depended on proof that the repairs enhanced the coat’s value, and whether expert testimony on lack of enhancement was wrongly excluded.
5. Whether any variance between the charging instrument and the proof at trial required reversal.

## Decision

- The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
- The court held that an owner may commit larceny of her own property by wrongfully taking it from a person in lawful possession under a lien, with intent to deprive that person of the lien and possessory rights.
- The evidence permitted the jury to find Cohen used a try-on pretext to obtain the coat and abscond with it to avoid payment and defeat Mellon’s lien, satisfying felonious intent.
- No reversible error resulted from the absence of a petit-larceny instruction, particularly where such an instruction was not requested.
- The artisan’s lien existed under the statute for labor and materials and did not require proof of increased market value; exclusion of expert testimony on “enhancement” was proper.
- Any variance between pleading and proof was immaterial and nonprejudicial.

## Legal Principles

- Larceny may be committed by a general owner who takes property from another who holds lawful possession by virtue of a special property interest (such as an artisan’s lien), if done with felonious intent to deprive the possessor of those rights.
- Statutory artisan’s lien laws can confer a sufficient possessory and special property interest to support larceny when the owner’s taking is intended to defeat the lienholder’s right to retain possession until payment.
- Felonious intent may be inferred from deceptive procurement of possession, refusal to pay, concealment or disposal of the property, and evasive conduct.
- A statutory artisan’s possessory lien for labor and materials is not contingent on proof that the work increased the chattel’s value.
- Failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction is not reversible error absent a request or a record showing the omission affected substantial rights.
- Minor, nonprejudicial variances between the charging allegations and trial proof do not require reversal.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Cohen’s grand larceny conviction, concluding that ownership does not bar larceny liability when the owner, by deceit and with intent to avoid payment, takes the chattel from a lienholder whose statutory lien confers a lawful right to retain possession until the lien is satisfied.


State v. Cohen, 196 Minn. 39, 263 N.W. 922 (Minn. 1935)