State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987)

Facts

  • Leonard Rollon Crawford was prosecuted for assault and unlawful carrying of a handgun under Md. Code art. 27, § 36B(b), which broadly prohibited carrying a handgun (open or concealed) absent limited statutory exceptions.
  • While in his second-story apartment, intruders entered and shot at Crawford.
  • During a struggle, Crawford disarmed an assailant; he then fell out of the window, and the handgun landed near him.
  • Wounded and believing the attackers were still pursuing him, Crawford picked up the handgun to protect himself.
  • Crawford lacked a meaningful opportunity to obtain police assistance before or during the emergency, including evidence that his phone service was disconnected and that he was dazed after the fall.
  • The attackers continued pursuing him and shot him again while he still had the handgun.
  • When Crawford encountered a police officer, he surrendered the handgun.
  • The trial court refused Crawford’s requested necessity-defense instruction on the handgun charge; the jury acquitted him of assault but convicted him of unlawful handgun carrying.
  • The intermediate appellate court reversed the handgun conviction; the State sought review.

Issues

  1. Whether the common-law defense of necessity is available to a charge of unlawful carrying of a handgun under Md. Code art. 27, § 36B(b).
  2. Whether the evidence in this case generated a jury question on necessity, requiring a jury instruction.

Decision

  • The court held that the common-law necessity defense is available, in principle, to a charge under § 36B(b).
  • The court held that Crawford produced sufficient evidence to generate the defense and was entitled to a necessity instruction.
  • The court affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s reversal of the handgun conviction and remanded for further proceedings.
  • Common-law defenses remain available in Maryland unless the legislature clearly abrogates them.

  • A comprehensive statutory scheme regulating handguns and providing permit procedures does not, without clear language, eliminate a narrow ex post necessity justification.

  • Necessity in the handgun-carrying context is limited and requires evidence of:

    • an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm;
    • no reasonable legal alternative to avoid the harm;
    • temporary possession directly tied to meeting the emergency (often after disarming an aggressor);
    • prompt surrender or dispossession once safe, with continued possession after the emergency outside the defense.
  • When evidence supports each element sufficiently to permit a rational finding of necessity, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction; refusal to instruct is error.

Conclusion

The court recognized a tightly confined necessity defense to Maryland’s handgun-carrying prohibition and required a jury instruction where the defendant’s brief, defensive possession of an assailant’s gun was compelled by an ongoing, life-threatening attack and ended with prompt surrender to police.