## Facts

- On June 26, 1991, Hector Gonzalez and Valerie Falcon left Seaside Park in Bridgeport, Connecticut, in a Ford Bronco with two children (a two-year-old and eight-year-old William Guisti Jr.).
- The Bronco followed a second vehicle driven by Fitzgerald Guisti to a street corner where several men, including Raul (Ray) Ivan Diaz, were gathered.
- After a hostile exchange involving Gonzalez and members of the group, Diaz and four others retrieved firearms from a car.
- The group fired approximately thirty-five to forty shots at the passing Bronco; about ten bullets struck the vehicle.
- A bullet killed eight-year-old William Guisti Jr.
- Diaz was charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of attempted murder, and carrying a pistol without a permit.
- The trial court instructed the jury on Pinkerton vicarious liability for conspirators and also included “common design” language as an alternate accessory theory.
- The jury convicted Diaz on all counts.

## Issues

1. Whether the jury was properly instructed that Diaz could be held vicariously liable under Pinkerton for murder and attempted murder committed by coconspirators.
2. Whether Pinkerton liability is consistent with the Connecticut Penal Code, including the structure of the felony-murder statute.
3. Whether applying Pinkerton liability in this case violated due process or the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.
4. Whether the “common design” accessory instruction permitted conviction without a finding of specific intent to kill.
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Diaz’s intent and participation for murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
- The court held that Pinkerton liability was properly charged and applied because the substantive offenses were within the conspiracy’s scope, in furtherance of it, and reasonably foreseeable.
- The court held Pinkerton liability does not conflict with the Penal Code or the felony-murder statute because Pinkerton predicates liability on an intentional killing by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- The court rejected Diaz’s ex post facto and due process challenges, including arguments that the state had to specify reliance on Pinkerton earlier in the case.
- The court concluded that, although “common design” language was improper, the instructions as a whole did not misstate the state’s burden to prove intent to kill.
- The court found the evidence sufficient, including circumstantial proof of intent drawn from the coordinated gunfire into an occupied vehicle.

## Legal Principles

- A conspirator may be held liable for substantive crimes committed by a coconspirator if the crimes are (1) within the scope of the conspiracy, (2) in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
- Pinkerton liability is compatible with a statutory scheme that limits felony-murder liability, because Pinkerton imputes an intentional homicide committed in furtherance of the conspiracy rather than creating strict liability for unintended deaths.
- An instructional error in describing accessory liability may be harmless if the charge, read as a whole, still requires the jury to find the defendant possessed the specific intent required for murder.
- A jury may permissively infer intent to kill from the deliberate use of firearms in a manner naturally likely to cause death, so long as the inference does not shift the burden of proof.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Diaz’s convictions, holding that Pinkerton vicarious liability properly allowed the jury to attribute the foreseeable, intentional acts of coconspirators to Diaz, that this theory did not conflict with Connecticut’s Penal Code or constitutional limits, and that any defect in the accessory instruction did not undermine the jury’s obligation to find intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.


State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 679 A.2d 902 (Conn. 1996)